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I. INTRODUCTION
A previous article by this author, Religious Totalism: Gentle
and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First Amendment,1 showed
that recruitment into many of the new religious cults2 may be, and
1. 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1977).
2. This Article does not use the term "cult" pejoratively, but uses it in its dictionary
sense: "a system of religious worship or ritual [with]... devoted attachment to, or extrava-
gant admiration for, a person, principle, . . .[by] a group of followers; sect." WER's
NEw WORLD DImTONARY 358 (college ed. 1968). Many cults are religious or spiritual in na-
ture, see, e.g., A. J. RuviN & M. RuDIN, PRISON OR PARADISE: THE NEw REIGIOus CuLTS 31-
97 (1980); C. STONER & J. PARKE, ALL GODS CHILDREN (1977) (describing most large religious
cults, including Children of God, Unification Church, Hare Krishna, and Scientology), while
others are secular, e.g., flying saucer cults; the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), Trial
Transcript of United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Cal. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as Hearst]; and the Manson cult, V. BUGLIOSI & C. GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER (1st ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as HELTER SKELTER].
Religious cults are found worldwide. See, e.g., CHARrrY FUNDs BUREAU, FINAL REP. ON
THE AcTrvrrms oF THE CHILDREN OF GOD TO HON. Louis J. LEFKOWrIz ATTY GEN. OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 3 (1974) (Children of God sect has more than 100 communes through-
out world) [hereinafter cited as LEFKowrrz REPORT]; The Darker Side of Sun Moon, Tim,
June 14, 1976, at 48 [hereinafter cited as TuM]; Beckford, A Korean Evangelistic Move-
ment in the West, in ACTS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF
RELIGION 319, 321-23 (1973) (Unification Church has branches throughout the world). The
number of members of religious cult groups is large, but difficult to estimate with any exact-
itude, see Delgado, supra note 1, at 6 n.25 (up to 3,000,000 American members of 200 to
1000 religious cults), and growing, Lanier, America's Cults Gaining Ground Again, U.S.
NEws AND WORLD REPORT, July 5, 1982, at 37, 39; see also J. MACCOLLAM, CARNIVAL OF
SouLs 13 (1979). For a psychohistorical explanation of this growth, see West & Delgado,
Psyching Out the Cults' Collective Mania, LA. Times, Nov. 26, 1978, pt. VII, at 1, col. 1
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often is, nonconsensual.5 Cult recruiters disguise that they are
proselytizing for a religious group,4 conceal the identity of the
group,5 and withhold from the prospective cultist the nature of the
commitment expected, the procedures to be undergone, and the
practices to be engaged in.' This deception effectively destroys the
possibility of a recruit's giving informed consent7 to induction into
the movement because the recruit lacks the knowledge necessary
for an intelligent choice whether to join.
After an initial period, the recruit's knowledge of the cult's na-
ture and practices gradually increases, but informed consent is still
not obtained. Although information increases, the capacity to
choose decreases:8 by a process of coercive persuasion,9 sometimes
(cults grow fastest in periods of rapid social change). Not all cults subject their members to
coercive persuasion or other destructive psychological techniques. For an attempted defini-
tion of the term "destructive cult," see J. CLARK, M. LANGONE, R. SCHECTER & R. DALY,
DaRmucriE CULT CONVERSION: THEORY, RESEARCH AND TREATMENT (1981) [hereinafter
cited as J. CLARK & M. LANGONE]. For other attempts at definitions, see C. STONER & J.
PARKE, supra, at 4 (nine criteria for determining cults); Rudin, The Cult Phenomenon: Fad
or Fact?, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 17, 24-30 (1980) (14 criteria).
3. Delgado, supra note 1, at 49-62.
4. Vermont Senate Comm. for the Investigation of Alleged, Deceptive, Fraudulent
and Criminal Practices of Various Organizations in the State 16 (Aug. 18, 1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Vermont Hearings]; C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 167; TIME, supra
note 2, at 48-49 (candidates lured by ads seeking persons interested in ecology, discussions
of contemporary morality or "interested in the betterment of mankind"); NATIONAL AD Hoc
CoMMrrrEE, THE UNIFICATION CHURCH: ITS AcTIVrriEs AND PRACTICES, A Meeting of Con-
cerned Parents, A Day of Affirmation and Protest, Feb. 18, 1976, pt. 1 (transcript of infor-
mational hearing held by United States Senator Dole), at 11 (improvement of world ecol-
ogy), pt. 2 (letters of testimony), at 16 (charitable service group), pt. 2, at 24 (community
action group) [hereinafter cited as Meeting Report]; J. MACCOLLAM, supra note 2, at 55-56
(Christian Peace Corps).
5. E.g., C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 27; LEFKOwrrz REPORT, supra note 2,
at 59-60; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 11, 12, 16, 21, 24.
6. E.g., C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 6, 7, 30; R. ENROTH, YOUTH, BRAIN-
WASHING AND THE EXTREMIST CULTS 102 (1977); Rofes, I was Brainwashed by the Followers
of Rev. Sun Myung Moon (But I Wised Up), HARv. CRIMSON, Sept. 30, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
7. Informed consent, as developed in medicine and experimentation with human sub-
jects, requires that the physician or experimenter explain the proposed treatment in ad-
vance and obtain the subject's agreement. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 244, 502 P.2d
1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972); J. KATZ, EXPERiMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 540-
608 (1972). The doctrine generally requires that the doctor explain to the patient all mate-
rial information about the proposed treatment which the patient likely would need to make
an intelligent decision to undergo or forgo the treatment. Typically, courts have held this to
include the diagnosis, prognosis, alternative treatments, and the costs, risks, and possible
benefits of each of the proposed treatments. For discussion of the doctrine of informed con-
sent as it has been applied to religious proselytizing, see Delgado, supra note 1, at 49-62;
Delgado, Cults and Conversion: The Case for Informed Consent, 16 GA. L. REv. 533 (1982).
8. For a discussion of the inverse relationship between information and capacity, the
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called "thought reform" or "brainwashing," 10 religious cults de-
prive inductees of the ability to make an independent assessment
of their cult membership. Cults discourage critical thought and
two key ingredients of consent, in cult joining, see Delgado, supra note 1, at 54-56 ("Manip-
ulation of Knowledge and Capacity," "Segmentation of the Joining Process"). See also Del-
gado, supra note 7, at 551-52 (section entitled: Unique Elements in Cult Conversion).
9. Social scientists use the term "coercive persuasion" to describe an intensive process
aimed at radically changing behavior and belief. The term apparently was first used by Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology social psychologist Edward Schein, E. SCHEIN, COERCIE
PERSUASION (1961), and Yale Medical School psychiatrist Robert Lifton, R. Lu'roN,
THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ToTALisM: A STUDY OF "BRAINWASHING" IN CHINA
(Norton ed. 1961). See J. CLARK & M. LANGONE, supra note 2; J. MEERLo, RAPE OF THE
MIND (1956); W. SARGANT, BATTLE FOR THE MIND (1957); J. SEGAL, LONG-TERM PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL AND PHYSICAL EFFECTS OF THE POW EXPERIENCE: A REviEw OF THE LITERATURE (1973);
P. ZIMBARDO & R. VALLONE, PERSUASION, COERCION, INDOCTRINATION AND MIND CONTROL
(1983); Bettelheim, Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations, 38 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 417 (1943); Farber, Harlow & West, Brainwashing, Conditioning and DDD
(Debility, Dependency, and Dread), 20 SocioMETRY 271 (1957); Strassman, Thaler &
Schein, A Prisoner of War Syndrome: Apathy as a Reaction to Severe Stress, 112 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 998 (1956).
The principal contexts in which coercive persuasion has been studied include closed,
high demand religious cults, see, e.g., Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981); J. CLARK & M. LANGONE, supra note 2, studies of prison-
ers of war, see, e.g., J. SEGAL, supra; Lifton, Home by Ship: Reaction Patterns of American
Prisoners of War Repatriated from North Korea, 110 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 732 (1954); Note,
Misconduct in the Prison Camp: A Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean
Cases, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 709 (1956), Chinese "re-education" camps, see, e.g., R. LIFTON,
supra, and small renegade groups like the SLA, see, e.g., Hearst, supra note 2, and the
Manson cult, see, e.g., HEITER SKELERr, supra note 2.
Although theorists disagree to some extent over the model that should be used to ex-
plain the changes observed in these settings, see, e.g., R. LPToN, supra (a psychoanalytic
model); W. SARGANT, supra (a neurophysiological model); E. SIRIN, supra (a social-psycho-
logical model), there is general agreement that the following techniques are used: isolation
of the victim from outside influences and former friends; control over the channels of com-
munication and information; physical and physiological depletion through overwork, insuffi-
cient hours of sleep, and an inadequate diet; instillation and magnification of guilt and anxi-
ety; threats of physical or spiritual annihilation if the individual does not join the group;
degradation and attacks on the former self and identity;, intense peer pressure, often applied
through group scrutiny or "struggle" sessions; alternation of harshness and leniency;, and
required performance of symbolic acts that betray former norms and values. See Peterson v.
Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d at 126; R. LIrON, supra; Delgado, Ascription of Criminal States of
Mind: Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded ("Brainwashed") Defen-
dant, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1978).
10. R. LIPTON, supra note 9, (describing experience of Western and Chinese victims of
Chinese "thought reform" universities and offering psychoanalytically based model to ex-
plain observed changes); see also United States v. Fleming, 19 C.M.R. 438 (A.C.M.R. 1954),
af'd, 7 C.M.A. 543, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957); United States v. Olson, 20 C.M.R. 461 (A.C.M.R.
1955) (court martials arising out of incarceration of American servicemen in North Korean
POW camps, raising issue of whether "brainwashing" defense is available in military law);
N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1954, at 16, col. 3 (disciplinary action not taken against Col. Schwable
because of finding that intense pressure applied during captivity rendered collaboration
with the enemy justifiable).
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choice," and bring to bear a variety of physical, 12 physiological,'s
and psychological' 4 techniques to induce conformity to a hierarchi-
cal system,' 5 acceptance of a complex ideology,' 6 and submission to
an authoritarian leader.17 Because of this structuring of the sociali-
zation process, knowledge of the nature and effects of the religious
cult, and capacity for free choice-requisites for informed con-
sent-are never present simultaneously."' At the outset when ca-
pacity is present, knowledge is lacking; sometime after induction,
11. See Delgado, supra note 7, at 548-49 (Cults use isolation, deny privacy and oppor-
tunity for reflection, and discourage questions and expressions of doubt.); STAFF REPORT,
INVESTIGATIVE GROUP TO THE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE ASSASSINATION OF REPRESENTATIVE LEO J. RYAN AND THE JONESTOWN, GUYANA TRAGEDY,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-19 (1979) [hereinafter cited as JONESTOWN REPORT]; C. STONER & J.
PARKE, supra note 2, at 159. See generally R. LIPTON, supra note 9, at 66-83 (repression of
doubt).
12. LEFKOWrrZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-36; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at
21 (remote setting, no means of return). For discussion of physical and physiological tech-
niques to produce attitudinal change and behavioral compliance, see generally GROUP FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, SympoSIUM No. 3: FACTORS USED TO INCREASE THE SUS-
CEPTIBiLrrY OF INDIVIDUALS TO FORCEFUL INDOCTRINATION 90-93, 103, 122, 123 (1956) [herein-
after cited as GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY]; Chodoff, Effects of Extreme,
Coercive and Oppressive Forces, in 3 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 384 (S. Arieti ed.
1966).
13. Hearst, supra note 2, at 256-57 (sensory overload, continuous tapes, chanting, fre-
netic activity); R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 49, 59, 64 (inculcation of fear and dread); Ver-
mont Hearings, supra note 4, at 63; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 24 (inadequate
diet and sleep); F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, SNAPPING 56-57, 133, 153 (1979) (induction of
state of narrowed awareness in which brain's information processing mechanisms are
impaired).
14. R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 59 (inculcation of fear and dread); Conway & Siegel-
man, Information Disease: Have Cults Created a New Mental Illness?, SCI. DIG., Jan. 1982,
at 86 (staged emotional experiences, suggestion, deceptive, and distorted language). For dis-
cussion of psychological techniques to induce thought reform and behavioral change, see R.
LIPTON, supra note 9; GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 12; P.
ZIMBARDO & R. VALLONE, PERSUASION, COERCION, INDOCTRINATION AND MIN CONTROL (1983);
Chodoff, supra note 12.
15. Delgado, supra note 1, at 24-25; LEFKOWrrz REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, 33; C.
STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 113. See generally JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 11.
16. Delgado, supra note 1, at 31-32 (we-they world view; indifference to society's
norms; willingness to lie and cheat in fundraising and recruiting because cult's mission over-
rides man's law), at 32-34 (potential for violence); see Hearst, supra note 2 (wealthy news-
paper heiress abducted by political extremist group that promoted violent overthrow of
American government). See generally JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 11 (describing Peo-
ple's Temple world view, including extreme punishment, even obligatory suicide for trans-
gressions); R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 178-79 (self-mortification required in Unification
Church); C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 106-07 (citing Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Jan. 24, 1972, at A-3, col. 5 (cult preached that inhalation of toluene, an industrial solvent,
was required to attain spiritual highs; two deaths resulted)).
17. Delgado, supra note 1, at 29-31 (regimentation; elders assign marital partners, su-
pervise training and discipline of children, forbid outside contacts).
18. See supra text accompanying notes 3-8; Delgado, supra note 1, at 54-56.
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when knowledge is present, capacity is lacking.
Nonconsensual induction of young people into any high-de-
mand group is manifestly a matter of social concern.19 Involuntary
recruitment into a religious movement is no less troubling; our so-
ciety regards freedom of choice in religious matters as a precious
right.20 Religious Totalism, therefore, proposed a range of meas-
ures aimed at protecting informed religious decisionmaking2' and
argued that these measures were morally and constitutionally
valid.22 This part of my thesis proved relatively uncontroversial.
I also noted that after induction into a cult, the range of reme-
dies available to protect adherents is more restricted than before
induction, consisting essentially of various types of legal or extrale-
gal deprogramming.2 3 Without offering any elaborate theory of jus-
19. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972) (state's interest in protect-
ing children against religiously motivated developmental injury); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (state's interest in protecting citizens from religious despotism);
Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395
U.S. 6 (1969) (state's interest in protecting citizens from psychological harm resulting from
religiously motivated drug ingestion). These and other social interests implicated in a deci-
sion to tolerate or regulate religious cultism are discussed in Delgado, supra note 1, at 10-36.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting free exercise of religion, forbidding the govern-
ment from establishing a religion).
21. Delgado, supra note 1, at 73-78 (discussing "preventive" remedies: requirement of
indentification; cooling-off period; public education; prohibition of proselytizing by certain
groups; licensing of proselytizers; and requests for rescue).
22. Id. at 10-73.
23. Id. at 78-92. Deprogramming is a form of confrontational therapy in which the
therapist, often an ex-cultist, attempts to neutralize the effects of cultic conditioning and
restore the individual's freedom of thought. The first modern deprogrammer, Ted Patrick,
describes his experiences and techniques in T. PATRICK, LET OUR CHILDREN Go! (1976). In
deprogramming, the deprogrammer challenges the cultist's dependence on and trust in the
cult and its leaders and attempts to demonstrate that he or she has been cheated and
duped. The deprogrammer may present facts about the cult or its leader that the member
may not know-for example that the leader has a prison record, or lives in luxury. He or she
may point out inconsistencies in the cult's teachings, or between its teachings and facts in
the real world, such as that the cultist's parents hate and reject her when they in fact care
deeply for her.
Frequently, the deprogrammee responds passively or hysterically. See, e.g., Peterson v.
Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). Typically,
however, the cultist will enter into exchanges with the deprogrammer. Once this happens,
deprogramming often proceeds rapidly, as programmed psychological mechanisms and be-
liefs are cast aside. Often, there comes a "breaking point," at which the cultist cries, laughs,
or embraces the deprogrammer. In these instances the deprogrammee normally will express
gratitude over having been rescued from the cult and indignation over the loss of liberty,
dignity, and property suffered while with the group. Delgado, supra note 1, at 78-80.
For purposes of legal analysis, there are three types of deprogramming. Voluntary
deprogramming; forcible deprogramming; and deprogramming carried out with a court's
sanction, usually in the form of an order of conservatorship. Voluntary deprogramming is
not illegal and will not be discussed further in this Article. See C. SToNER & J. PAKz, supra
1076
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tification, I suggested that involuntary deprogramming of cultists
in a condition of thought reform would be constitutional if carried
out under judicial supervision following a hearing at which it
were found that no less intrusive means of restoring the cultist to
full functionality existed.2" This part of the thesis proved highly
controversial. 2 Anticult organizations and some academic writers
praised it and the leading state court decision on deprogramming,
Peterson v. Sorlien,27 cited it with approval. But it drew equally
strong criticism from writers who attacked my deprogramming
note 2, at 234; Delgado, supra note 1, at 91-92. Forcible deprogramming is illegal, although
possibly subject to the defense of necessity or choice-of-evils defense. See Note, Cults,
Deprogrammers and the Necessity Defense, 80 MICH. L. REv. 271 (1982). Illegal deprogram-
ming will not be discussed further in this Article. This Article focuses exclusively on
deprogramming carried out by a court order. The aim of this Article is to show that such
deprogramming is constitutionally and morally valid when certain criteria of coercive per-
suasion are present and when deprogramming is confined within specified limits.
24. For descriptions of deprograrmings, see T. PATRICK, supra note 23. Judicial con-
servatorship effects court ordered deprogramming. Conservatorship permits a family mem-
ber or other interested party to take legal control of an incompetent person. Provisions for
conservatorship or guardianship exist in every state. Often a statute will also provide for
temporary or emergency conservatorship or guardianship, typically for a 20 or 30 day pe-
riod, following a brief hearing at which the moving party establishes a need for protection of
the proposed conservatee. For a more complete discussion, see Delgado, supra note 1, at 88-
91. Recently, a number of special conservatorship statutes have been proposed to deal ex-
pressly with the cult situation, although apparently none have been enacted. See, e.g., Aro-
nin, Cults, Deprogramming, and Guardianship: A Model Legislative Proposal, 17 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 163, 201 n.258 (1982).
25. Delgado, supra note 1, at 85-92.
26. The legal analysis of deprogramming is more difficult than the analysis of prein-
duction remedies, such as disclosure or informed consent. Deprogramming occurs after be-
lief in the cult is fixed and hence confronts the constitutional prohibition of regulation of
religious belief. See infra notes 94-153 and accompanying text. Moreover, many Americans
understand and approve of the idea of informed consent, but are skeptical of the possibility
of "brainwashing," see Reich, Brainwashing, Psychiatry, and the Law, 39 PSYCHOLOGY 400
(1976); Szasz, Patty Hearst's Conversion: Some Call it Brainwashing, THE NEw REPUBLIC,
Mar. 6, 1976, at 10-12, perhaps because the idea raises internal resistance and calls up vul-
nerabilities we would rather not confront. At the same time, the urgency of the deprogram-
ming task is lightened by two considerations. First, some evidence suggests that cults may
be gradually beginning to improve in the informed consent-disclosure area-in part because
of the criticism their practices have drawn from commentators and the public. Interview
with John Lofland, Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, University of California, Davis, at Hutch-
ins Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, California, (June 27,
1983). But see C. EDWARDS, CRAZY FOR GOD 13 (1979); 122 Cong. Rec. 8083 (1976) (use of
front groups with innocuous sounding names continues). Second, an increase in the number
of voluntary deprogrammings, or "mutual reassessments" appears to be underway, as more
knowledgeable parents act promptly after learning that their son or daughter has entered a
cult. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 91-92. Voluntary deprograrnming generally is effective
only in the early stages of cult engagement. Id. at 92.
27. 299 N.W.2d 123, 128-29 (Minn. 1980).
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suggestion on moral, conceptual, or constitutional grounds.2"
The most rigorous of the critics is Robert Shapiro, whose arti-
cle, "Mind Control" or Intensity of Faith, argues that deprogram-
ming cannot be justified merely by showing that an individual was
once subjected to thought reform; it must also appear that he or
she is currently in a nonautonomous, thought-controlled state.29 A
second, recently published article expands on this suggestion.0
The present Article offers a defense of deprogramming and a
reply to its critics, particularly Shapiro.3 1 Part II reviews what hap-
pens in many instances of cult joining and offers a conceptual ac-
count that justifies deprogramming of cult members who are una-
ble to comprehend or surmount the coercive and deceptive
influences that led to their commitment. Part III addresses consti-
tutional problems that are triggered in the event that deprogram-
ming should affect religious belief-an event that is by no means
inevitable. Part IV discusses deprogramming and whether some
variant of it is capable of remedying the type of situation ad-
dressed in part II without violating the constitutional strictures
identified in part III. The Article concludes with an analysis of ob-
jections to my thesis and answers to those objections.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR DEPROGRAMMING
A. Cults and Autonomy
Certain paradigms are associated commonly with deprivation
of human autonomy or freedom: A keeps B imprisoned in a locked
room; A places a dagger in B's hand and moves B's arm in order to
plunge the dagger into C's chest; A holds a gun to B's head and
28. A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY, THE NEW VIGILANTES: DEPROGRAMMERS, ANTICULTISTS,
AND THE NEW RELIGIONS, 224 (1980); Anthony & Robbins, Legitimating Repression, TRANS-
ACTIoN/SOc'Y, Mar. 1980, at 39; Gutman, Extemporaneous Remarks, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 69 (1979); LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 599 (1978); Robbins, Religious Movements, the State, and the Law: Reconceptual-
izing "The Cult Problem," 9 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33 (1979); Shapiro, Of Robots,
Persons, and the Protection of Religious Beliefs, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1277 (1983); Shupe,
Spielmann & Stigall, Deprogramming: The New Exorcism, 20 Am. BEHAV. SCIENTIsT 941
(1977); Note, Conservatorships and Religious Cults: Divining A Theory of Free Exercise, 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1247 (1978); Comment, To Keep Them Out of Harm's Way? Temporary
Conservatorships and Religious Sects, 66 CALiw. L. REV. 845 (1978); Comment, "Mind Con-
trol" or Intensity of Faith: The Constitutional Protection of Religious Beliefs, 13 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 751 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, "Mind Control"].
29. Comment, "Mind Control," supra note 28, at 785, 793.
30. Shapiro, supra note 28.
31. Shapiro's critique is singled out, for the reasons mentioned above, although much
of the discussion will apply to other authors as well.
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forces her to confess. These are all cases of physical coercion or of
a threat of physical injury sufficient to prevent the resulting action
or inaction from being freely or autonomously chosen.
Some forms of volitional impairment, however, do not fit these
models. Deception or informational deprivation is an example.
When A substitutes arsenic for salt in B's salt shaker, B does not
autonomously or voluntarily opt for suicide when he sprinkles ar-
senic on his food, thinking it to be salt.2 Since the will translates
information into action, manipulation of the will also can inhibit
autonomy.33 Hypnotism is one example of manipulation, but
more intrusive and powerful techniques have been devised. Physi-
cians can implant "stimoceivers" into human brains and, through
remote monitoring, modify or prevent behavior that would other-
wise occur.3" Physicians and others can use drugs in a variety of
ways to influence thoughts, volition and action by heightening or
dulling emotions.3 6
Recruiting practices of new religious cults include elements of
both types. The cruder forms of physical manipulation are not un-
known s7 but informational deprivation and assaults on decision-
making capacity are more common. A youth can go from a "din-
ner" or "rap session" to a "weekend retreat"3' 8 without being
informed that he or she is dealing with a religious movement or
entering upon the first steps of what the recruiters intend to be a
32. In this case, B does not intend to commit suicide, but only to season his food. B's
suicide thus is not autonomous. The criminal law makes a similar distinction. See W.
LAFAvw & A. ScOrr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 356-60 (1972).
33. When B performs an act without willing to perform it, we do not attribute the act
to B's autonomous agency. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 32, at 337-41 (au-
tomatism, epilepsy, sleepwalking, unconsciousness, hypnosis).
34. Delgado, supra note 9, at 13-14 (comparing brainwashing and hypnotism); see also
People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App. 2d 284, 338 P.2d 495 (1959) (expert testimony on hypnosis
allowed; courtroom demonstration denied).
35. Delgado, supra note 9, at 11-12, 17; Delgado, Organically Induced Behavioral
Change in Correctional Institutions: Release Decisions and the "New Man" Phenomenon,
50 S. CAL. L. REv. 215, 227-32 (1977).
36. Delgado, supra note 35, at 232-238; Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior
Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 237
(1974).
37. See, e.g., JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-6, 17-19 (coercive environment
present in People's Temple commune in Guyana); Vermont Hearings, supra note 4, at 59-
60; F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 13, at 88 ("physical punishment, reported by
approximately one in five respondents, included beatings, starvation, physical bondage"); R.
ENROTH, supra note 6, at 59; Rofes, supra note 6, at 4, col. 1 (cult brother threatened to
break both his legs if that was necessary to prevent Harvard student from leaving cult).
38. Vermont Hearings, supra note 4, at 78; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 11,
12, 16, 21, 24; Delgado, supra note 1, at 38-40, 54-55.
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lifetime commitment. For most recruits, the knowledge of what lies
ahead-complete submission to a rigid doctrine, heirarchical sys-
tem and authoritarian leader,39 isolation from friends and family
who are not members of the group,40 self-mortification rituals,41
eighteen hour workdays soliciting contributions for nonexistent so-
cial programs, 42 and abandonment of ordinary personal, career,
and marriage plans44--would make them no more inclined to go to
the "dinner" or "weekend retreat" than would someone not suici-
dally inclined to eat arsenic.
Informational deprivation plays a decreasing role as the new
recruit is drawn gradually into the web of cult initiation. Cult lead-
ers disclose details of hierarchy, lifestyle, doctrine and submission,
but only after they perceive that the individual, as a result of an
intense and carefully orchestrated process of psychological manip-
ulation, has lost the capacity to assess their significance." The
components of that process vary somewhat from cult to cult, but
many similarities exist. A few cults use drugs45 or other esoteric
means," but most of the techniques are relatively ordinary-their
efficacy results from the combination and intensity with which
they are applied.47 Physical techniques employed by cultists in-
clude stress,48 overwork,49 sleep deprivation," isolation from the
39. Delgado, supra note 1, at 13, 21-25; Delgado, supra note 7, at 549-50, and sources
cited therein, e.g., Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 27, 34, 62; R. ENROTH, supra note
6, at 72, 121; LEFKOWITZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. See generally JONESTOWN REPORT,
supra note 11.
40. Delgado, supra note 1, at 40, 50-51, 54; see Vermont Hearings, supra note 4, at 79;
Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 7, 21, 66; LEFKowrrz REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-37.
41. R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 178-79; C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 106-
07.
42. C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 5-31, 121-33; see Meeting Report, supra
note 4, pt. 1, at 24, pt. 2, at 11, 14, 24, 36, 38; R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 49, 64.
43. Delgado, supra note 1, at 14.
44. VERMONT SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., TRANsCRIPT, Mar. 10, 1976, at 22-23 [hereinaf-
ter cited as VERMONT SENATE JUDICIARY COMM.]; C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 6-8.
45. C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 106-07; Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 24,
1972, at A3, col. 5 (sect members found dead after inhaling toluene).
46. For charges that cult leaders employ something akin to hypnotism, see T. PATRICK,
supra note 23, at 38.
47. Delgado, supra note 1, at 63-69.
48. C. EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 157-58; R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 49, 59, 64; C.
STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 10, 122-23; Delgado, supra note 1, at 16-17, 55.
49. Delgado, supra note 1, at 19; see Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 24, pt. 2,
at 11, 14, 24, 36, 38.
50. Vermont Hearings, supra note 4, at 56; LEFKOWrrZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 38;
see Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 25, pt. 2, at 7, 12, 41, 74; C. EDWARDS, supra note
26, at 162; Cf. J. SEGAL, supra note 9, at 8-27.
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rest of society,51 and in some cases abuse or threats.2 Physiological
techniques include sensory bombardment of various forms5" and
inadequate diet.54 Among the psychological techniques cults use
are emotional isolation from friends and family,5 "love bomb-
ing," ' "5 deprivation of privacy,57 repetitious chanting and lectures,
58
instillation of guilt,59 submissiveness, 0 and dependency.61
These techniques combine to produce an individual who has
neither the opportunity nor capacity to assess critically his or her
engagement with the religious group nor to consult outsiders who
may introduce an unwanted skepticism.2 Although the recruit
seemingly has committed himself or herself to the cult, the organi-
zation's recruiting tactics progressively have undermined the indi-
vidual's capacity to make a free and open choice. Against this
background of questionable influences and pressures, of which the
recruit is generally only dimly aware, the recruit's final commit-
ment could seldom be characterized as an expression of free choice
51. See sources cited supra note 12; see also Communist Interrogation, Indoctrina-
tion and Exploitation of Am. Military and Civilian Prisoners: Hearings Before the Perma-
nent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operation, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16-17 (1956).
52. R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 178-79 (mandatory self-mortification); Delgado, supra
note 1, at 50-51 and sources cited therein.
53. JONESTOWN REPORT, supra note 11, at 17; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at
12, 14; R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 39-40, 59; see, e.g., Hearst, supra note 2, at 256-57
(expert testifies on auditory overstimulation as technique of coercive persuasion).
54. Vermont Hearings, supra note 4, at 63; R. EN oTH, supra note 6, at 160; C.
STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 106-07, 138; see Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at
7, 12, 24, 66, 74; cf. J. SEGAL, supra note 9 (POW studies).
55. LEFKOWrrZ REPORT, supra note 2, at 36-39; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at
25, 33.
56. Delgado, supra note 1, at 40 (describing "lovebombing"-pretended affection by
trained veterans to convince recruit that organization cares deeply about him or her); see C.
EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 128 (same).
57. R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 39-40, 59; Delgado, supra note 1, at 41.
58. Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 12, 14, 24; W. PETmSON, THOSE Cumous
NEW CULTS 130 (1973); C. STONER & J. PARK, supra note 2, at 5-8.
59. LEFKOWITz REPORT, supra note 2, at 36; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 7,
14, 57, 71; C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra note 2, at 279-80.
60. Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 14, 18, 34, 57, 62, 64; see LEFKOWITZ RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 11; Rofes, supra note 6, at 34, col. 1.
61. Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 7, 9, 21, 65; R. ENRoTH, supra note 6, at 12,
183; Beckford, supra note 2, at 321, 324, 332 (1973).
62. R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 119, 121-24; Rice, Messiah From Korea: Honor Thy
Father Moon, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Jan. 1976, at 36, 39 (quotations of Reverend Moon:
"What I wish must be your wish." "The time will come ... when my words will almost
serve as law. If I ask a certain thing it will be done."); see also Meeting Report, supra note
4, pt. 2, at 7, 9, 21, 37; R. LIPTON, supra note 9 (identity change under pressure); Hearst,
supra note 2, at 157-58 (same).
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or individual autonomy.
B. The "Freeze-Frame" Approach
Assuming that a new religious group has induced an individual
to join it by using recruiting tactics similar to those just described,
this Article will examine the legal remedies available to a parent,
spouse, or other person who would like to extricate the individual
from cult control and see him or her return to his or her precult
freedom. The most well-known remedy is removal of the individual
from the cult, followed by some form of counterconditioning, or
deprogramming, aimed at restoring the person's freedom of choice.
Theories of deprogramming are discussed in part IV of this Article.
Critics of deprogramming reject all of these approaches. Their
across-the-board rejection is based on the following argument, best
articulated by Shapiro: (1) in determining whether deprogramming
is justifiable in an individual case, the relevant state of mind of the
cult adherent is the one he or she has at the time deprogramming
is sought;6" (2) even though a cult might originally have deceived
or coercively persuaded an individual to accept a particular belief,
he or she subsequently may have embraced that belief on the basis
of an autonomous preference;6 (3) if an individual is able to "af-
firm and adopt" a religious belief, that belief should not be sub-
jected to the potentially destructive influences of deprogram-
ming;65 (4) as long as the cult adherent is a person rather than a
robot or a zombie, the person is able to form and adopt a belief
and a court should not permit involuntary deprogramming.6
The first and second points contain important insights. A
standard justification for deprogramming is that the cult has
brainwashed the devotee into adherence and thus the individual
never freely has accepted the group or its beliefs. 7 Deprogramming
is seen as restoring the individual to freedom of thought and asso-
ciation.6 8 The second point reminds us that the current mental
state of a cult devotee may be independent of his or her original
brainwashing. Just as one might be taken against one's will to a
63. Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1288-89.
64. Id. at 1292-93.
65. Id. at 1300, 1309.
66. Id. at 1309.
67. E.g., A. J. RuDIN & M. RUDiN, supra note 2, at 127-28; Delgado, supra note 1, at
81-82, 85-88.
68. A. J. RUDIN & M. RUDIN, supra note 2, at 122-23, 125; Delgado, supra note 1, at
81-82.
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place where it turns out that one wants to spend the rest of one's
life (as in the story of Shangri-La), the cult adherent may make a
perfectly free commitment to the group and its beliefs subsequent
to his or her brainwashing. The court is dealing with the individual
as he is now, and not as he was when brainwashed, thus it must
respect his subsequent autonomous commitment and refuse to per-
mit deprogramming.
Although these are valid points, they are interwoven in the
critics' views with an analysis that should be rejected: the "freeze-
frame" approach. This requires that courts evaluate a proposed
deprogramee only as he presents himself at the hearing-that is,
without taking into account the personal, historical process that
led to the individual's joining the cult or adopting the beliefs."
The "freeze-frame" analysis is spelled out in the third and fourth
points: if the individual present at the hearing is a person seem-
ingly able to "affirm and adopt" religious beliefs, that is the end of
the matter.70 The court will deem cult commitment voluntary and
deprogramming forbidden.
The tactical effect of this analysis is to stack the deck against
advocates of deprogramming. The concerned parent or spouse
must show that the cult adherent is a nonperson-a "robot"7' 1 who
is unable to "affirm and adopt"72 religious beliefs. The extreme dif-
ficulty in proving either of these claims suggests the "freeze-frame"
approach would be fatal to attempts to obtain court ordered
deprogramming.
Advocates of deprogramming should not have to deny that the
69. See supra note 62. Some hearings on short term, or emergency, conservatorships
are ex porte, that is, only the moving party appears; he or she makes the case for conserva-
torship based on depositions and other evidence. Delgado, supra note 1, at 88-91. Except in
emergency situations, this approach would seem to violate due process, as has been argued
by Aronin, supra note 24, at 223-28.
70. Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1300, 1309.
71. Id. Shapiro's argument is curious. He derives his conclusion about personhood
from highly selective philosophical sources, id. at 1283-85, while it is by no means univer-
sally agreed in the philosophical literature that human beings who are severely volitionally
and cognitively impaired, as are cult victims, should be regarded as persons. See, e.g., R.
DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641), Meditation 11 (man essentially a
thinking being); R. RoRTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 10 (1982) (personhood involves a
"complex interlocked set of beliefs and desires").
72. Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1300, 1309. Here Shapiro abandons his philosophical
account of personhood and adopts a behavioral one-an individual is a person if he or she
acts like one. This account is not accepted by philosophers, nor within the law. See Stone,
Should Trees Hove Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 450, 450-54 (1972) (to deem an individual a person is to make a normative or moral
judgment that the individual is to be included among those accorded respect and rights).
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cult adherent is a person. What must be shown is that the adher-
ent is a brainwashed person who has yet to overcome his or her
brainwashing. Nor need it be argued that the cult adherent lacks
the ability to "affirm and adopt" religious beliefs. It must appear
only that the commitments formed by the devotee have not been
adopted freely but induced by a brainwashing process that he has
yet fully to understand or surmount.
The main defect in the "freeze-frame" approach is not the cri-
teria it employs but what it leaves out. The approach, by ignoring
the thought control to which the individual has been subjected 73
and any account of how the individual has dealt with it, distorts
relevant legal presumptions and makes it impossible to render a
discriminating judgment on whether deprogramming is permissible
in any particular case. Consent to remain with the cult that ap-
pears to be freely given will be presumed voluntary on a "freeze-
frame" approach7 ' but once evidence of brainwashing and noncon-
sensual induction is introduced, that presumption should disap-
pear, if not be reversed. A court may more reasonably presume the
continuity of the individual's brainwashed mental state, 5 unless it
can be shown that the individual has in some way been able to
escape the effects of the brainwashing and give a truly voluntary
consent.
7 6
In determining whether an individual has surmounted his or
her coercive persuasion, the following questions are relevant: Does
the individual understand the forces that the cult brought to bear
73. Coercive persuasion of a person could be proved in two ways: Indirectly by show-
ing that he or she has been subjected to intensive thought reform, see supra notes 36-61 and
accompanying text, and directly by psychological examination, see Delgado, supra note 1, at
70-71 (criteria of cult indoctrinee syndrome); CoMmrrEE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS,
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Assoc., DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, disor-
der 300.15, at 260 (3d ed. 1980) ("persons who have been subjected to periods of prolonged
and intense coercive persuasion ... while the captive of terrorists or cultists") (DSMMD-
III); R. LIPToN, supra note 9 (post-thought reform syndromes); see also J. CLARK & M.
LANGONE, supra note 2; J. MEERLO, supra note 9; RuDiN, supra note 2; A. J. RUDIN & M.
RuDnN, supra note 2; E. ScaiN, supra note 9; J. SEGAL, supra note 9; C. STONER & J. PARKE,
supra note 2; P. ZIMEARDo & R. VALLONE, supra note 9.
74. Voluntariness is ordinarily presumed, both in criminal and civil law, unless un-
usual situations exist that justify an opposite presumption. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (presumption reversed in custodial questioning of suspects).
75. Evidence law generally favors an inference of continuity on the part of mental
states. See D. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 695-96 (2d ed. 1972)
(mental conditions, once established, presumed to continue unless contrary evidence is
shown).
76. The analysis offered in this Article expressly provides for this possibility. See infra
notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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on her, especially the coercive persuasion or brainwashing em-
ployed? Does she know that the cult deceived her and reduced her
to a state of dependency? Does she understand the range of life
possibilities within the cult compared to those available outside
the cult? If the cult adherent can respond coherently to these
questions,77 current affiliation is, indeed, a product of a free choice
in spite of the brainwashing undergone. In this case deprogram-
ming is inappropriate and the individual should be allowed to re-
main with the cult.78 If no such understanding has been achieved,
however, then the current consent is probably no more free and
voluntary than the original brainwashed commitment. 79  The
"freeze-frame" approach fails to raise any of these issues. It looks
at only nominal consent without examining the processes underly-
ing it.8o
C. An Alternative Approach-Return to Informed Consent
A better approach to evaluating when deprogramming is per-
missible requires a return to the criterion of informed consent. As
previously mentioned, the requirement of informed consent led to
"truth-in-proselytizing" and similar constraints on cult solicitation
during the preinduction stage."' Informed consent is no less rele-
vant to the deprogramming issue and its postinduction context.
Deprogramming is not justified when the brainwashed individ-
ual has surmounted his coercive persuasion and made a voluntary
77. Examination is not limited to these questions. These are merely examples of ques-
tions that a court could use to probe a cultist's mental state. The questions must be flexible
enough to detect programmed-in responses. Boilerplate questioning invites the cults to pro-
gram their followers to respond in predesignated ways to the anticipated questions. See
Treatment of Children by Cults: Hearings Before N.Y. Assembly Comm. on Child Care, pt.
2, at 262 (Aug. 9, 1979) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Hearings]; C. STONER & J. PARKE, supra
note 2, at 91-92 (cults train members in techniques of resisting deprogramming, e.g., by
chanting or "closing the mind").
78. This writer once suggested that the cultist must appear to understand these mat-
ters from our perspective-from that of the outsider, rather than that of the cultist. Del-
gado, supra note 1, at 59-60. This criterion seems, in retrospect, to be too easily manipu-
lated and is accordingly dropped.
79. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
80. In other words, a deprogramee may pass Shapiro's test too easily- both the free
cultist and the one under thought control will answer the question, "Do you choose to re-
main in the cult?" the same way-the former because he in fact so chooses, the latter be-
cause he has been so programmed. Follow-up questioning can expose the abnormal quality
of the latter's response.
81. Delgado, supra note 1, at 73-78 (preinduction or preventive remedies); Delgado,
supra note 7, at 533.
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choice to remain with the cult.8 2 In that case, the individual's sub-
sequent autonomous preference sustains his commitment to the
group despite his earlier induction by coercive persuasion. The
principal difficulty with this lies in formulating an adequate legal
criterion for determining whether an autonomous preference
exists.
A special adaptation of informed consent can be used for this
purpose. If the cult devotee can appreciate the nature of the forces
she has been subjected to, knows that the cult has deceived and
manipulated her, but nevertheless prefers to remain with the cult
and adhere to its beliefs and practices, it is reasonable to suppose
that she has made a free and voluntary rather than a brainwashed
commitment. When the cult adherent possesses the information
necessary for informed consent, and the original recruiting tactics
no longer impair or impede her volitional capacity,8 3 a court should
give full credence to the cultist's consent.8 4 Therefore, deprogram-
ming is justifiable only if the individual adherent lacks either an
informed understanding of the processes that led to her cult com-
mitment or the volitional capacity to give autonomous consent to
it, 8 5
This conceptual constraint on permissible deprogramming
suggests the following consequences. First, deprogramming should
aim at providing the relevant information and restoring the voli-
tional capacity necessary for informed consent. As soon as the
deprogramee comprehends and has the capacity to choose, invol-
untary deprogramming is no longer justified. The deprogrammed
individual may then evaluate his own position and make his own
choices. This may include returning to the family, returning to the
cult, or indeed some further possibility.8 6 Second, deprogramming
should be deemed successful if it restores the capacity for informed
82. Cf. J. CALmARI & J. PERmLO, CoNTRAcTs 235 (2nd ed. 1977) (contracts unenforce-
able because of minority later ratifiable by the child on reaching majority).
83. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
84. Cf. S. FREUD, INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 501-17 (Penguin ed.
1974) (Lecture 28) (psychoanalytic cure achieved by patient's remembering and bringing to
consciousness factors underlying his problem); see also Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123
(Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981) (court gave legal effect to cultist's
postdeprogramming desires because these represented her real self); Dworkin, Autonomy
and Behavior Control, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1976, at 23, 25-27.
85. These two requirements are not independent. Volitional capacity flows from in-
formed understanding, and an individual probably cannot possess the former without the
latter.
86. See, e.g., A. PAvLos, THE CULT EXPERIENCE 149 (1982) (individual abandoned Uni-
fication Church after deprogramming; went in search of a more rewarding cult).
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consent. The possibility that an individual might then return to
the cult does not make the deprogramming unsuccessful.
7
Deprogramming is only unsuccessful when the deprogramee con-
tinues to lack the relevant knowledge and volitional capacity to
make his own choices. Third, as previously explained, deprogram-
ming is an impermissible response to cult brainwashing if the dev-
otee has surmounted her own brainwashing and made an autono-
mous commitment to the group and its beliefs. In this case the
individual already has achieved the goal of deprogramming-the
comprehension and volition necessary to overcome brainwashing.
Thus, self-deprogramming precludes involuntary deprogramming. 8s
III. DEPROGRAMMING-CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
Under the test outlined in part II, some cultists will be
deprogrammed. The framework will allow for the deprogramming
of individuals who have been nonconsensually brainwashed into
cult adherence and are unable to surmount that influence without
outside assistance. A proponent can seek to justify state engage-
ment in deprogramming by reason of the state's traditional inter-
est in the health and welfare of citizens. 8
Several writers, however, have argued that deprogramming is
unconstitutional because it infringes upon religious belief and
practice.90 The infringement occurs because some cultists will
abandon their cult beliefs and affiliation following a successful
deprogramming. 91 Some have argued that since the degree of pro-
87. A number of deprogrammers speak of deprogramming as "successful" if the cultist
remains with the parents and does not wish further contact with the cult. See, e.g., T. PAT-
RICK, supra note 23, at 37. But see id. at 75-77. This Article rejects that definition; the only
correct purpose of deprogramming is to restore personal choice. See J. MAcCoLLAM, supra
note 2, at 117.
88. A number of writers consider deprogramming an evil made necessary because of
cult brainwashing. See, e.g. Rudin, Remarks in Panel Discussion, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 106 (1980). But deprogramming is also necessary because in many cases cults do not
allow individuals the opportunity to self-deprogram.
89. The state's police power often has been invoked to justify interference with relig-
iously motivated action. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 861-62 (5th Cir.
1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439,
446-47 (D.D.C. 1968).
90. See, e.g., Gutman, Extemporaneous Remarks, 9 N.Y.U. Rxv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 69
(1979); LeMoult, Deprogramming Members of Religious Sects, 46 FORDHAm L. REv. 599
(1978); Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1305-11; Note, Conservatorship and Religious Cults: Di-
vining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1247 (1978).
91. Note, however, that this is not part of the definition of a successful deprogram-
ming. See supra text accompanying note 80. A deprogramming is successful if it restores
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tection afforded religious belief is absolute, the pragmatic "police
power" concerns mentioned above cannot outweigh such an inter-
est.9 2 Section A will examine the manner in which deprogramming
impinges upon religious belief; in section B the language, history,
and policy of the free exercise clause will be applied to the
deprogramming controversy; and section C will assess deprogram-
ming in light of criteria employed in recent religion cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court.93
A. Deprogramming-Constitutional Effects
It is uncertain precisely how deprogramming infringes upon a
constitutionally protected area. Deprogramming carried on within
the framework of part I is aimed neither at the destruction of an
existing belief, nor at conversion to a more conventional religion,
but rather at restoration of free and informed choice in religious
affiliation and belief. Three possibilities remain: State-supported
deprogramming is unconstitutional because it (1) causes a poten-
tial loss of religious belief; (2) entails criticism of religious prac-
tices; or (3) constitutes criticism of religious beliefs.
1. Potential Loss of Belief
Deprogramming can lead to abandonment of religious belief.9
This does not necessarily mean, however, that state-supported
deprogramming violates the first amendment. Teaching the theory
of evolution in state schools has the potential to cause students to
relinquish previously held religious beliefs in favor of scientific
atheism.9 5 Similarly, exposure to the "big-bang" cosmological the-
ory 6 might influence some to adopt monotheism rather than athe-
freedom of thought for a cultist who had lost that faculty as a result of brainwashing. The
cultist subsequently may rejoin the cult or a different group. This action does not count
against the success of the deprogramming.
92. See infra notes 111-45 and accompanying text (discussing status of programmed
religious belief).
93. This Article concentrates on the first amendment implications of deprogramming.
More general constitutional due process concerns are not dealt with. For a discussion of the
latter issues, see Aronin, supra note 24.
94. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text; T. PATRICK, supra note 23, at 37
(describing successful deprogrammings); Delgado, supra note 1, at 80.
95. Darwin's Origins of Species and Descent of Man had a devastating impact on Bib-
lical literalism, particularly on the theory of Divine Creation-according to which God cre-
ated the world and man about three thousand years ago.
96. This is the cosmological theory that the universe originated, more or less simulta-
neously, in a colossal explosion millions of years ago. See F. HOYLE, THE NATURE OF THE
UNIVERSE (rev. ed. 1960); F. HoYE, ASTRONOMY AND COSMOLOGY: A MODERN COURSE (1975).
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ism or polytheism. Nevertheless, teaching evolution or the "big-
bang" theory in a state school is neither a violation of free exercise
nor an establishment of religion.97 The potential of state-supported
practice to affect religious belief does not itself make that practice
constitutionally suspect. If the deprogrammee herself freely
chooses to give up cultic adherence and beliefs based on informa-
tion given and discussion sparked during a deprogramming, then
that would seem no more constitutionally objectionable than for a
student to give up monotheism on the basis of the theory of evolu-
tion or return to it on the basis of the "big-bang" theory. These
changes of belief or adherence are instances of free exercise, not
violations of it.
2. Criticism of Practices
Case law suggests it is not constitutionally suspect for the
state to support criticism of an allegedly religious practice of brain-
washing. The deprogrammer typically will attempt to expose and
criticize the coercive persuasion that the deprogrammee has under-
gone. The cult might well attempt to justify its particular mode
of conversion as an essential part of its religion.99 But the state
through the legislature and the courts may criticize racial discrimi-
nation, even though some groups claim to practice it on religious
grounds.100 The facts and the opinion in Bob Jones University v.
97. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
98. T. PATRICK, supra note 23, at 25-26, 32, 67, 78; VERMoNT SENATE JUDICIARY CoMM.,
supra note 44, at 25-26.
99. One cult justifies deception of the public to win converts on the basis of a doctrine
known as "heavenly deception." R. ENRoTH, supra note 6, at 115; Delgado, supra note 1, at
41. Since the candidates initially are under the influence of Satanical forces and their own
ignorance, and thus will not turn to the cult on their own, only trickery and deceit can win
them over. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp.
147 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981), for a
description of the Krishna doctrine of "Sankirtan," or aggressive proselytizing. The court
found that the Krishnas, imbued by this doctrine, raised funds at a New York State fair by
violating their agreement with the fair officials to wear identification badges, slurring the
word "Krishna" to make it sound like "Christian," wearing disguises, such as Santa Claus,
inventing fake programs and purposes, telling couples they had been selected the best look-
ing couple at the fair and would win a prize, and miscounting change by folding bills in half.
They preyed on the handicapped, servicemen, and others deemed specially vulnerable, and
sold records with photographs of leading musical groups on the cover even though the actual
records contained only Krishna chants and wails. 506 F. Supp. at 158-63. "Sankirtan" justi-
fied these practices on the premise that the public is diseased and ignorant and will not
donate to Krishna on its own. Id. at 153, 158.
100. Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
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United States0 1 provide a recent affirmation of this principle.
Government attitudes towards polygamy, 102 child labor,103 blood
transfusions,104 and controlled substances 1 5 also indicate that the
state may criticize or even outlaw practices asserted to be religious
without constitutional violation. Thus, the incidental criticism of
religious practices in order to cure the psychological and physical
dangers of coercive persuasion is not unconstitutional.
3. Criticism of Beliefs
Critical discussion of the tenets of the cultist's faith does not
appear to violate the free exercise clause. The deprogrammer
sometimes will attempt 06 to engage the cultist in a critical discus-
sion of the cult's belief system.1 07 Typically this is defended as nec-
essary to reawaken the adherent's rational faculties so that a genu-
ine assessment of her relationship to the group is possible.108 The
point is that the dialectic-serving values of the first amendment 10
are served better by deprogramming carried out within the concep-
101. In the Bob Jones University case, the Supreme Court denied a tax exemption to
a religiously affiliated university because it enforced segregation in student dating and
marriage.
102. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
103. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
104. In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Ander-
son, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
105. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395
U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968); State v. Bullard, 267
N.C. 599, 148 S.E.2d 565 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 32-88.
107. T. PATRICK, supra note 23, at 25-26, 32, 67, 78; Shapiro, Destructive Cultism, 15
AM. FAm. PHYS. 80, 81 (1977); see Gunther, Brainwashing: Persuasion by Propaganda,
TODAYS' HEALTH, Feb. 1976, at 16-17.
108. See VERMONT SENATE JUmCIALRY CoMM., supra note 44, at 25, 26 (deprogrammer
shows cultist how cult has manipulated and deceived him); R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 79-
80 (deprogrammer shows cult teachings inconsistent with facts in real world); T. PATRICK,
supra note 23, at 31-32 (deprogrammer shows cultist unpalatable facts about the cult, the
leader, or his personal or financial conduct), 25-26, 32, 67, 78 (deprogrammer shows incon-
sistency among cult teachings).
Moreover, there are the free speech rights of the deprogrammer to be considered, Weiss
v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I.), afl'd mem., 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 929 (1979), but these are significantly weakened by the cultist's being a "captive
audience," Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas J., concur-
ring); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1970). See L. TRIE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-21, at 692 (1980).
109. The first amendment values of freedom of speech, religion, and thought are each,
in large part, dialectic-serving because they facilitate debate, challenge, and change in ideas,
beliefs, and theories. See infra text accompanying notes 120-53; L. TRINE, supra note 108,
§ 10-1, at 476-77, § 14-3, at 816-17, § 15-6, at 902-03.
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tual framework of part I than an opposite approach that leaves
brainwashed cult members untreated or indirectly encourages ex-
tralegal deprogramming with its potential excesses. 110 A related ob-
jection, that the deprogramming impermissibly inquires into the
truth or falsity of religious belief, is examined in the next section.
B. Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause
One difficulty in assessing the constitutional status of
deprogramming is the extent to which the first amendment pro-
tects religious belief. The Supreme Court has yet to decide or even
extensively comment on this issue since its free exercise cases have
concerned conduct or action rather than belief.111 The Court has
said, and commentators have repeated, that belief, unlike action,
receives absolute protection under the first amendment, 2 but this
still has the status of dictum.11  Although it is far from certain that
properly conducted deprogramming would infringe religious values
at all,114 a careful interpretation of the free exercise clause respect-
ing belief may well clarify both this issue and the extent of consti-
tutional protection of belief. This inquiry requires an examination
of the language of the free exercise clause, its historical back-
ground, and the policies underlying free exercise.
1. The Language of "Free Exercise"
The language of the first amendment does not support abso-
lute protection for all religious belief. The amendment provides
that "Congress shall make no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise
110. The excesses include middle-of-the-night forcible abductions, high speed chases,
confrontational deprogrammings carried out under lock and key with little or no neutral
supervision, and serious risk of legal jeopardy for those concerned. See T. PATRICK, supra
note 23; Delgado, supra note 1, at 78-82; see also ACLU CONFERENCE ON RLIGIOUS
DEPROGRAMMING, DEPROGRAMMING: DocuMrNnNG THE ISSUE (1977) [hereinafter cited as
ACLU].
A related objection that deprogramming entails inquiry into the truth or falsity of reli-
gious belief is addressed in the next section.
111. The dictum about a twin standard of protection has been repeated in a number
of cases, all of which concern religiously motivated conduct. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
112. See cases cited supra note 111; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development. Part L The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HAnv. L. REv.
1381, 1387 (1967); Comment, "Mind Control," supra note 28, at 751-52 (belief protected
absolutely, but this principle due to be tested soon); Note, supra note 28, at 1258-59.
113. See supra note 112.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 89-113; infra text accompanying notes 115-
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[of religion]." 115 Assuming belief to be part of exercise, logically the
amendment protects freely held religious belief, rather than reli-
gious belief simpliciter.
The consequences of this assumption for the deprogramming
issue are highly significant: deprogramming may endanger the reli-
gious beliefs of the cultist, but often these will not be freely held
beliefs. 11 Deprogramming is constitutionally suspect only if the
first amendment protects all religious belief. To suppose that the
Constitution protects all religious belief-including coerced be-
liefs-from state interference is to make the "free" in "free exer-
cise" unnecessary and, indeed, misleading. In order to give the
word "free" in the text of the amendment its rightful weight it
must be assumed that the clause protects only freely chosen or un-
coerced religious belief and action. Thus, deprogramming is not
unconstitutional because it endangers only what the first amend-
ment does not protect: unfree religious belief and conduct. If
deprogramming is carried out within the constraints laid down in
part I, there is no free exercise value to be balanced against the
state's health and welfare justification for deprogramming.
This interpretation of the language of the first amendment is
consistent with the dicta calling for absolute protection of religious
belief. The United States Supreme Court has not dealt with free
exercise cases that have concerned coerced religious belief or con-
duct. In the Court's free exercise cases, the beliefs in question were
freely held and the conduct freely engaged in."7 The dicta calling
for absolute protection of religious belief should be confined to
freely held religious beliefs. A broader interpretation is unneces-
sary and out of harmony with the language of the first amendment.
2. Free Exercise-Historical Background
The known history of the first amendment also supports the
interpretation proposed above. Two of the important figures be-
hind the adoption of the Bill of Rights in general and the first
115. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 32-88 (cult values and attachment inculcated
by process of coercive persuasion). One could even attribute the beliefs so acquired to the
brainwasher rather than the brainwashee. Cf. Delgado, supra note 9 (making similar argu-
ment in criminal law context).
117. See cases cited supra note 112. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), for
example, the Amish apparently freely embraced their custom of educating their own chil-
dren. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308-11 (1940), Cantwell seems to have freely
adopted and acted upon his belief in aggressive public proselytizing.
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amendment in particular saw religious freedom as a value inti-
mately related to mental freedom. Thomas Jefferson viewed free-
dom of religion as equivalent to freedom of mind,118 and James
Madison wrote, in defending free exercise, of society's interest in
every individual's possessing freedom of thought.'19
This historical perspective suggests that deprogramming pro-
motes rather than destroys constitutional values. Religious belief
that is the product of coercion or brainwashing rather than free
choice would hardly merit constitutional protection in the eyes of
those who saw free exercise as protecting freedom of thought; suc-
cessful deprogramming that restores freedom of thought and
choice to a previously brainwashed individual might well have met
with their approval.
3. Policies Underlying Free Exercise
A constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion furthers
a number of policy goals apart from the freedom of thought em-
phasized by the Framers. These underlying values include strife
avoidance, 20 self-definition, 21 the marketplace of ideas, 22 and
freedom from inquiry.'23
Deprogramming carried out within a legal framework should
118. J. BLAU, CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 74-75, 78-79 (1949); D.
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 110 (1951); T. JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establish-
ing Religious Freedom, in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950) ("Al-
mighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his supreme will that free it shall
remain .... ") (italicized words deleted from original 1779 draft prior to adoption by Vir-
ginia General Assembly in 1786. Id. at 547, 552 n.2).
119. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 610 (1967); W. SwEET, RELIGION IN
COLONIAL AMERICA 338-39 (1942); see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 10-13
(1946).
120. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); L. TRmE, supra note 108, § 14-12, at 868.
121. See L. TRmE, supra note 108, § 14-4, at 821-23; Freeman, A Remonstrance for
Conscience, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 806 (1958) (freedom of religion protects values individuals
care deeply about and by which they define themselves); see also Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333, 340-341 (1970) (religion defined as central core of a person's beliefs); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
122. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952); L. PFEFFER, CREEDS IN COM-
PETITION (1958); L. TRmE, supra note 108, § 14-3, at 816, § 14-7, at 834; 2 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMRS MADISON 183-91 (G. Hunt ed. 1901). Numerous religious freedom cases were also de-
cided on free speech or free expression grounds. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705
(1977); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
123. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (verity of religious doctrine or
belief may not be inquired into by state in prosecution for mail fraud); L. TRmE, supra note
108, §§ 14-6, 14-11 to -12.
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further the goal of strife avoidance because it will reduce the likeli-
hood of parental or spousal resort to the disruptive and dangerous
tactic of extralegal deprogramming. 124 The alternative laissez-faire
approach 25 only encourages self-help on the part of one or the
other party.126 A laissez-faire attitude does not avoid strife be-
tween cults and anticult movements12 7 but merely ignores the ex-
isting strife without offering any solution or mediating mechanism.
Legal deprogramming also promotes the value of self-defini-
tion implicit in the free exercise clause.'28 A brainwashed cult ad-
herent has not defined himself by his membership in the group; he
has been defined in terms of the cult through sophisticated tech-
niques of coercive persuasion. An individual can only achieve self-
definition once he understands and surmounts the effects of the
brainwashing, either by self-deprogramming or deprogramming
commenced by others. 2 '
Deprogramming promotes rather than impairs the market-
place of ideas. 30 A brainwashed individual has been taken out of
124. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
126. For example, cults concerned with the possibility that the parents of a member
are planning his or her abduction and deprogramming may move the member to another
city or country. VERMONT SENATE JUDICIARY CoMmIrTE, supra note 44, at 31; R. ENROTH,
supra note 6, at 28-32; Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 33, 51, 53; LEFKowrrz REPORT,
supra note 2, at 5, 16-17.
127. The anticult movement is a loosely organized group of private membership organ-
izations of parents and ex-members. The main organizations are, Free Our Children From
the Children of God (FREECOG), Citizens Freedom Foundation, American Family Founda-
tion, Return to Personal Choice, and Citizens Engaged in Freeing Minds.
128. See supra note 121.
129. Self-definition concerns may have been partly responsible for the decision in Pe-
terson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981). In Sor-
lien, a young cultist was tricked into leaving the cult and subjected to involuntary extralegal
deprogramming. At first she resisted strenuously, but then spent several days in the com-
pany of her parents and the deprogramming team, shopping and engaging in recreational
activities. 299 N.W.2d at 127. During this time, she had many opportunities to escape and
rejoin the cult but did not do so. Later, she met with her fianc6, a cult member, but follow-
ing the meeting she rejoined the cult, and filed suit against her parents and the
deprogrammers.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the parents' defense of consent. See Aronin,
supra note 24, at 195; Delgado, supra note 7, at 561-62. The court recognized the reality of
religious. Coercive persuasion, 299 N.W.2d at 129, and weighed the validity of the young
woman's professions at the three times in question-before entry into the cult, during her
stay in the cult, and after deprogramming (when she returned to her pre-existing identity).
Id. at 128-29. Judging that her precult self was her real self, the court gave effect to her
statements and intentions after deprogramming and thus upheld the defense of consent. Id.
at 129. For further analysis of Sorlien, see Delgado, supra note 7, at 561-62.
130. Freedom of religion has sometimes been linked to the marketplace-of-ideas no-
tion associated with freedom of speech. See supra note 122.
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the marketplace of ideas and subjected to a particular monopoly of
ideas. She is coerced into adopting the religious ideas of the cult
and discouraged from making any critical comparison or assess-
ment.131 Only by reawakening critical thought processes can the
adherent re-enter the marketplace of ideas and make her own
choice for or against the ideas of the group.
Another value associated with free exercise is freedom from
inquiry. The state may not inquire into the truth or falsity of a
religious belief or demand that an individual defend that belief
before a court or other governmental body.1 3 2 There are two ways
in which deprogramming arguably conflicts with freedom from in-
quiry: first, the deprogramming process itself might constitute an
inquiry into religion; second, the finding of brainwashing necessary
to permit deprogramming 33 might constitute an inquiry into
religion.13 4
The deprogrammer should be concerned only with inquiring
into the mode of attachment of the individual to his religion and
with revealing this mode of attachment to the individua. 135 The
deprogrammer must avoid any attack on the truth value of the ad-
herent's religion." Although the deprogrammer may challenge the
adherent to examine his belief with a critical eye as a means to
reverse the effects of brainwashing, the questioning ordinarily does
not approach a constitutionally forbidden inquiry into the truth or
falsity of religious beliefs. When questioning does occur, it seems
to be limited to the internal consistency of the tenets of the faith,
the manner in which the higher leaders of the organization abide
or do not abide by them in their daily lives, and their ability to
account for well-known truths about the external world.1 3 7
131. See supra notes 8-18 & 37-62 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 123.
133. See generally supra text accompanying notes 32-88 (when deprogramming
permissible).
134. The position of the ACLU on cults seems to be that religious practice, short of
crime, should be above official scrutiny. See ACLU, supra note 110, at 5-8, 134, 208-16;
Gutman, supra note 90, at 70-71.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 32-88 (when deprogramming morally and
constitutionally permissible).
136. See sources cited supra note 123 (truth or falsity of religious claim may not be
inquired into). Moreover, most deprogrammers currently active do not do so, in part be-
cause it is ineffective-who could prove to a young Moonie that Reverend Moon is not the
Lord of the Third Advent, or to a Scientologist that reincarnation does not occur?-and
increases resistance. Indeed, deprogramming does not seem to work if the deprogrammer
conveys an attitude of hostility toward all religion or fails to take seriously the search for
religious truth that drove the deprogrammee to the sect. Delgado, supra note 1, at 79 n.398.
137. See supra notes 23 & 107-08 and accompanying text; see also R. ENROTH, supra
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The second argument that an investigation concerning
whether brainwashing occurred violates freedom from inquiry is
more important because it calls into question the very possibility
of deprogramming. In Katz v. Superior Court13 a California appel-
late court explained: "When the court is asked to determine
whether [a] change [of lifestyle] was induced by faith or by coer-
cive persuasion, is it not. . . investigating and questioning the va-
lidity of that faith?" 13 9 If a court is constitutionally forbidden from
determining whether an individual has been coercively persuaded
into religious adherence, the evidentiary burden necessary to jus-
tify deprogramming would never be satisfied.
The correct response to the question raised by the Katz court
is no: an inquiry into brainwashing or coercive persuasion is not an
investigation into the truth, falsity, or validity of a faith, but
rather into the mode of attachment of an individual to it. Nothing
in the description of the brainwashing process in part II implicated
the issue of the verity, validity, or theological status of the result-
ing religious beliefs. Moreover, a finding of coercive persuasion is
compatible with the truth of the religious beliefs so inculcated; to
determine that an individual has been brainwashed into a religious
belief is not to determine, directly or indirectly, that the belief is
false.
Opponents of deprogramming could respond that freedom
from inquiry extends beyond scrutiny of the content of beliefs to
encompass inquiry into mode of attachment.140 If this were the
case, the evidentiary base for deprogramming would again be un-
obtainable for constitutional reasons.
The problem with this response is that the United States Su-
preme Court already has placed its constitutional imprimatur on
inquiry into mode of attachment in two lines of precedent. When
an individual requests exemption on the ground of his religious be-
lief from regulations that would otherwise apply, the government is
permitted to inquire into both the sincerity14' and centrality
42 of
note 6, at 12, 34 (deprogrammers showed deprogrammee proof that methods and teachings
were similar from cult to cult); Harayda, I Was a Robot for Sun Myung Moon, GLAMOUR,
Apr. 1976, at 216, 260 (deprogrammer played NBC documentary on cult's leader).
138. 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977).
139. Id. at 987, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
140. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (raising question whether inquiring
into way belief was formed might be impermissible inquiry into religion).
141. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 337 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); People v. Woody, 61 Cal.
2d 716, 726-27, 394 P.2d 813, 820-21, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76-77 (1964).
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the belief. A belief that is insincerely held or merely peripheral to
the individual's religious system is not accorded the same respect
as a sincerely held and central belief.14
The Court has yet to consider the permissibility of inquiry
into religious thought reform, but it seems to have drawn a sharp
line between inquiry into truth or falsity and inquiry into mode of
attachment. To investigate the brainwashing issue seems no more
inquisitorial or intrusive than an inquiry into centrality or sincer-
ity.1 4' It would be ironic if the first amendment value of religious
liberty precluded a court from reviewing coercive practices endan-
gering that very same religious liberty. It seems better to restrict
judicial inquiry into the verity of religious beliefs, a restriction that
poses no problems for the advocate of deprogramming.' 45
4. The Special Protection for Religion and Religious Exercise
Themes drawn from the preceding subsections suggest a possi-
ble independent justification for denying programmed-in religious
belief full constitutional respect. Religion's history, its recognition
in the text of the Constitution, and an unbroken line of case law
indicate that religion has a special place in our scheme of political
and legal values. 46 Actions, affiliations, and beliefs that are reli-
gious in nature receive greater judicial deference than they would
have if their nature had been secular-political, economic, or pru-
dential, for example. 147 Cult groups know this; indeed, evidence
suggests that certain groups, which began as secular self-help/ther-
apeutic organizations, adopted the trappings of religion to reduce
official scrutiny of their practices.1 48
142. 61 Cal. 2d at 720-26, 394 P.2d at 817-20, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73-76; see also Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 109 (1943); Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 860 (5th
Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
143. See cases cited supra notes 141-42; L. TamE, supra note 108, § 14-11.
144. This approach merely applies to belief a mode of analysis the courts now apply to
action. When allegedly religiously motivated action is challenged, courts look to its sources
to see if it in fact issues from religious beliefs. When religious belief is put in question, a
court similarly should be able to look to the sources of the belief to see whether they contain
anything that puts them, or their genuineness, in question. Like insincerity or noncentrality,
brainwashing should be one of those factors.
145. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 111-34 and accompanying text; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 231 n.28 (1977); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943).
147. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965); see also Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970).
148. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); Delgado, supra note 1, at 42 n.242.
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Regardless of whether a cult that uses thought reform cyni-
cally adopted the mantle of religion, the fungibility of the doctrine
taught suggests it should receive reduced protection. Once a con-
vert has been weakened physically by sleep deprivation, inade-
quate food, and constant activity, and psychologically by mind
numbing rituals, chants, and inadequate privacy and opportunity
for reflection, she will accept whatever form of doctrine is thrust
on her by the leaders.149 The only requirements are that the body
of principles be large, complex, vaguely inspiring and depict the
organization as arrayed against outside forces of darkness.15 0
If a religious system just as easily could have been nonreligious
at the time of its inculcation into a believer, does this deprive the
system of its special quality under the Constitution? An indication
that this might be so is supplied by conscientious objector cases,
such as United States v. Seeger.151 In Seeger, the Supreme Court
upheld the claim for conscientious objector status of a registrant
who held unconventional beliefs and seemingly was not a member
of any church.15 2 Because Seeger's beliefs played a part in his life
parallel to that played by the orthodox beliefs of a religious person
clearly entitled to exemption, the Court held that Seeger must also
be exempted from military service. 53 The inverse of the Seeger
proposition is also arguably true; if an ostensibly religious system
plays a part in the life of the holder parallel to the part played by
a nonreligious system in the life of a person not entitled to an ex-
emption, then the beliefs could be treated as nonspecial. Seeger
thus suggests a two-plane view of belief: Religious beliefs occupy a
higher plane, and all others a second, lower plane. Functional in-
terchangeability defines the location of a particular belief on one or
the other plane. When a court finds that the principal use of a set
of beliefs is to control adherents and perceives that a set of secular
beliefs could have served this purpose just as easily, the court will
149. The doctrine's actual content is relatively unimportant. E. HEFrMANN, DARK SIDE
OF THE MooNIrs 251 (1982).
150. Patty Hearst's captors used a Maoist political theory; Reverend Moon uses Di-
vine Principle, a mixture of Christian and Eastern theology and numerology; Scientology
uses a mixture of science fiction, personal therapy, and spiritual transmigration. See gener-
ally A. J. RUDIN & M. RUDIN, supra note 2, at 31-96 (for descriptions of the beliefs and
practices of the most popular cult groups, including those named herein); C. STONER & J.
PARKE, supra note 2, at 33-51.
151. 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341
(1970).
152. 380 U.S. at 186-87.
153. Id. at 176, 187.
[Vol. 37:10711098
DEPROGRAMMING
be entitled to find the system of beliefs nonreligious under the ex-
tended Seeger test proposed here.
C. Deprogramming and First Amendment Criteria
The Supreme Court has developed a number of criteria for as-
sessing the constitutional status of laws or regulations that may
affect religious conduct or belief. These first amendment criteria
include the following:154 (1) neutrality, (2) secular purpose, (3) sec-
ular effect, (4) excessive entanglement, and (5) minimal intrusive-
ness or least restrictive alternative. This section will examine the
proposed state supported practice of deprogramming in light of
these constitutional criteria.
1. Neutrality
The Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that state action
is not constitutional unless it is neutral in its treatment of reli-
gions. 155 Deprogramming does not fail this test, despite the asser-
tions of some cult defenders. 56 As explained in part II,157
deprogramming is a response not to the content of coercively per-
suaded beliefs or the identity of the persuader, but to the coercive
persuasion itself. A state-supported practice of deprogramming
would distinguish between recent cults and the older mainstream
religions only insofar as the former and not the latter use the de-
ceptive and coercive techniques already outlined.1 58 If a main-
stream religion brainwashed its adherents in the same way cults
do, deprogramming similarly should be available.
The argument that brainwashing is a "necessary stage" that
all religions go through, so that a prohibition against brainwashing
in effect discriminates in favor of old, established religions, is im-
plausible.1 59 Although new religions are typically evangelistic, this
154. These criteria are drawn from both free exercise and establishment clause cases.
While the two religion clauses are analytically distinct, they are, in practice, difficult to
untangle. Thus, the following analysis incorporates the first amendment concerns of both
clauses.
155. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (civil
courts must decide disputes over church property without resolving doctrinal controversies),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
156. A number of critics of deprogramming and other forms of intervention make this
criticism. Gutman, supra note 90, at 71; Kelley, Deprogramming and Religious Liberty, Civ.
Lm. REv., July-Aug. 1977, at 23, 30; LeMoult, supra note 90, at 599, 640.
157. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 4-18 & 37-62 and accompanying text.
159. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982) (Minnesota requirement that
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is very different from using deception and thought reform. The
early Christians, for example, were vocal and open about their
faiths; no one could become a member without knowing it.le
°
2. Secular Purpose
The requirement that a state-supported practice have a secu-
lar purpose 61 is also met by deprogramming carried out within the
framework of part I. The purpose of deprogramming is to restore
freedom of thought to individuals deprived of it by coercive per-
suasion. Freedom of thought and religious belief are clearly secular
values implied by the first amendment.162 The deprogrammer may
not, of course, attempt to instill a religion into the deprogrammee,
otherwise deprogramming would have a nonsecular or religious
religious organizations which raise more than 50% of their funds from nonmembers obtain
permit, held unconstitutional because it unfairly burdens small, new sects that have few
members and thus necessarily must fundraise among the nonmember public). Larson does
not reach the situation under discussion. Unlike fundraising, deception and coercive persua-
sion are not essential and socially innocuous activities of church organizations. Coercive per-
suasion does not, as noted in the text, mark the beginning stages of every, or even most,
religions, and does not necessarily correlate with small size or newness of a cult or sect. Hare
Krishna claims to be a descendant of Hinduism and to be over 1200 years old. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 151-53 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
(ancient historical antecedents of Krishna movement), rev'd, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). Scientology, a relatively new cult, is large and powerful. A. J.
RUDIN & M. RuniN, supra note 2, at 22 n.28.
160. The early Christian proselytizers were joyous, open, and aboveboard ("Have you
heard the good news?").
The neutrality of the deprogramming option should extend even further to cases of
brainwashing by nonreligious groups. Armed Forces psychiatrists and psychologists used a
type of mild deprogramming (called "debriefing" or "re-entry therapy") with returning
POWs after the Korean and Vietnam wars. See, e.g., Lifton, Home by Ship: Reaction Pat-
terns of American Prisoners of War Repatriated from North Korea, 110 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
732 (1954); Schein, The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War, 19 PSYCHIA-
TRY 149 (1956); J. SEGAL, THERAPE UT C CONSIDERATIONS IN PLANNING THE RETURN O1 AAERI-
CAN PRISONERS OF WAR TO CONTINENTA UNITED STATES, U.S. NAvY REP. No. 72-37 (1973).
Deprogramming could also be used on members or hostages of terrorist political groups such
as the SLA or the Manson cult. See Delgado, supra note 9, at 31-32 (discussing deprogram-
ming as a dispositional option when defendant found not guilty by reason of brainwashing).
Since deprogramming is justified as a restoration of autonomy and personal choice to
brainwashed individuals, it should be available whatever the content of the improperly in-
culcated belief. See supra notes 33-61 & 81-88 and accompanying text.
161. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (establishment clause re-
quires that statute have a secular purpose); see also L. TRImE, supra note 108, § 14-8.
162. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir.
Ct., Wayne County, July 10, 1973) (freedom of thought protected as aspect of freedom of
expression); Shapiro, supra note 36, at 253-58 (1974) (freedom of "mentation" derived from
first amendment). See generally L. TRIE, supra note 108, §§ 15-7 to -8 (1978) (freedom of
the mind).
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purpose in contravention of the first amendment.16
3. Secular Effect
The Court also has required that state action have a secular
effect and that any nonsecular effect be indirect or incidental.
164
The direct secular effect of deprogramming is to restore freedom of
thought and association to deprived individuals. Providing the
deprogrammer does not attempt to destroy or change religious be-
lief, it is unclear what would be the nonsecular effect of state-sup-
ported deprogramming. Religious groups found by courts to brain-
wash their adherents might consider this a stigma and change their
behavior to avoid a repetition of such a finding. They might in-
struct their proselytizers to give full disclosure, and substitute
standard methods of teaching and conversion for their former coer-
cive and deceptive tactics. But these effects are secular and highly
desirable. Moreover, they do not flow from the deprogramming but
from the judicial finding that justifies the deprogramming.
4. Excessive Entanglement
The Supreme Court has also required that a state regulation
or practice not result in excessive entanglement of government in
religious affairs. 165 Aimed at promoting both free exercise and
nonestablishment values, the rule against entanglement is designed
to keep religious and state authorities from interfering with each
other's proper spheres of influence.166 The type of entanglement
that would be alleged in connection with state-sponsored
deprogramming would be "administrative entanglement. 1 67 Ad-
ministrative entanglement occurs when government surveillance or
163. See Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 509 (8th Cir. 1980) (forced inculcation
of religious values unconstitutional); see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961)
(a state cannot constitutionally force person to profess religious belief).
164. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also L. TRIBE, supra
note 108, § 14-9.
165. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976)
(first amendment prohibits civil court from inquiring into procedural or substantial ecclesi-
astical law); Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 224 Ga. 61 (1968), rev'd, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969) (first amendment limits the role of civil courts in church property disputes); Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952) (a state cannot regulate church oper-
ation and appointments of clergy by requiring conformity to church law).
166. See, e.g., L. TRmz, supra note 108, § 14-12, at 865 (1978) (The rule against ex-
ecessive entanglement is "born of a desire to minimize government intrusion into the reli-
gious realm" and to ensure that secular and religious authorities do not "interfere exces-
sively with one another's respective spheres of choice and influence . . .
167. See id. § 14-12, at 869-71.
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oversight intrudes too deeply or continuously into matters of the
spirit.16 8 Impermissible entanglement is likely to be found when
government carries out "substantive evaluations" of religious prac-
tices, 119 engages in "extensive. . . investigation into church opera-
tions and finances,"1 0 purports to make "difficult classifications of
what is or is not religious,"17' or attempts to resolve internal
church disputes about property or theology. 7 2
Judicially authorized deprogramming as proposed in this Arti-
cle should not violate the prohibition against excessive entangle-
ment. The court will, of course, have to supervise the actual
deprogramming, in person or through a representative,7 3  but
deprogramming is a secular, not a religious, activity. 74 The re-
quired supervision should no more offend the entanglement rule
than would court-supervised medical treatment of a minor or in-
competent person.
Although judicial engagement in deprogramming should not
constitute entanglement, it might be urged that the judicial fact-
finding necessary to authorize deprogramming would draw the
court impermissibily into matters of religious belief and govern-
ance. '7 But the judicial examination that would precede court-or-
dered deprogramming would probe neither deeply nor protractedly
into matters of religion. To win approval for deprogramming, the
moving party would need to show that the proposed deprogram-
mee was subjected to techniques of coercive persuasion-sleep
deprivation, guilt manipulation, isolation, '7 -but these are
scarcely core religious practices. They are, rather, secular tech-
niques that cult groups have adopted because they have found that
they work-they help retain recruits." 7 Moreover, the judicial
factfinding is a one-time-only event, limited to the individual
168. See, e.g., L. TRmIE, supra note 108, § 14-12, at 866.
169. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (rejecting "governmental
evaluation" of church social service programs in decision to grant tax-exempt status).
170. Id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 698 (Harlan, J., concurring).
172. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Pres-
byterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
173. See generally Aronin, supra note 24, at 233-73 (legislative proposal); Delgado,
supra note 1, at 86-88 (measures to control abuses in court-ordered deprogramming).
174. See supra notes 94-145 & 161-64 and accompanying text.
175. Governmental intrusion into such matters is forbidden by the anti-entanglement
doctrine. See supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 10-15 & 34-61 and accompanying text.
177. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 46-47 (arguing that coercive thought reform tech-
niques are not central to any religion).
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before the court, and does not entail any continuing monitoring of
the group's activities. The hearing occurs at the initiative of a pri-
vate party, usually a family member. No government agency is cre-
ated or other form of long-term scrutiny established. When cults
cease to use thought reform techniques, deprogramming and judi-
cial scrutiny will cease.
5. Minimal Intrusion/Least Restrictive Alternative
When state regulation does affect religious conduct or belief
the Court has typically required that the state intervene in a mini-
mally intrusive way. 17 No less intrusive means than state-sup-
ported deprogramming is available to cure the brainwashing prob-
lem. The government could legislate and enforce informed consent
requirements, 179 or other preinduction remedies.180 But these tac-
tics aim at preventing cult brainwashing, not at solving the prob-
lem of individuals who have already been brainwashed.
Deprogramming will be necessary so long as less intrusive preven-
tive remedies are unavailable or operate imperfectly. Since any-
thing short of total surveillance will allow some determined cult
groups to brainwash members of the public, deprogramming would
seem to be a necessary back-up measure to restore religious liberty
and freedom of thought after coercive persuasion has deprived an
individual of these rights. The health and welfare values men-
tioned earlier 81 and the restoration of freedom of thought and reli-
gion18" 2 justify this minimal intrusion.
IV. THEORIES OF DEPROGRAMMING
Many, perhaps most, procult writers take the position that all
forms of involuntary deprogramming are unconstitutional. Accord-
178. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)
(state action that interferes with free exercise rights must constitute least restrictive alter-
native for promoting compelling state interest).
179. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 73 (proposing requirement of disclosure). See
generally Delgado, supra note 7 (informed consent requirement would be feasible and
would survive constitutional objections).
180. See Delgado, supra note 1, at 73-78 (discussing range of "preventive" or before-
the-fact remedies).
181. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
182. Arguably, in these circumstances, it is not necessary to balance individual inter-
ests against state interests because the Court only requires balancing when state action in-
fringes an individual's free exercise rights. Here, state action does not infringe a free exer-
cise right because cultic coercive persuasion has destroyed the individual's ability to exercise
that right. Deprogramming restores that ability.
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ing to these writers it is not necessary to articulate a theory of
deprogramming or understand precisely how it works. For anticult
writers, deprogramming is a necessary corrective for the coercive
persuasion cultists may be subjected to by the new religious
groups."i 3 Since procult advocates reject the claim of cult brain-
washing, 1 4 they see deprogramming as a solution without a prob-
lem, an unconstitutional invasion of religious liberty rather than a
restoration of it.""5 Given these fundamentally different appraisals
of what deprogramming achieves, it is not surprising that little
agreement exists on how deprogramming works. Even 'within the
respective movements, no single picture has emerged of how
deprogramming operates to achieve its ends.
This part will attempt to throw some needed light on these
issues. Section A examines and assesses procult perspectives on
deprogramming; section B explores anticult perspectives on the op-
eration of deprogramming and constructs a theory on the basis of
reports of actual deprogrammings by participants and
investigators.
A. How Deprogramming Works-The Procult Perspectives
Procult advocates describe deprogramming in a variety of
ways. Some supporters see it as a form of brainwashing in which
the deprogrammer coercively persuades the cultist to abandon her
freely chosen religious adherence. 88 Others analogize deprogram-
ming to exorcism1ST- cult ideas are likened to devils that must be
exorcised from the individual before she can return to society. A
related view maintains that the main point of deprogramming is to
convince cultists that they were the victims of cult brainwashing. 88
This myth facilitates the individual's transfer from the cult family
to his biological family and the rest of noncult society. Hence, fam-
ily, relatives, and friends do not have to deal with the individual's
cult adherence at face value, or, as a freely chosen commitment to
values and goals radically different from those of "straight" soci-
183. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 1, at 85-91; T. PATRICK, supra note 23; A. J. RUDIN
& M. RuDIN, supra note 2.
184. See sources cited supra note 156.
185. See sources cited supra note 156.
186. See sources cited supra note 156; see also ACLU, supra note 110.
187. A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY, THE NEw VIGILANTES: DEPROGRAMMERS, ANTi-CuLTISTS,
AND THE NEW RELIGIONS 75-78 (1980); Shupe, Spielmann & Stigall, Deprogramming: The
New Exorcism, 20 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 941, 947-51 (1977).
188. See, e.g., Richardson, Conversion, Brainwashing, and Deprogramming, CENTER
MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 18, 24.
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ety. The procultists argue that the anticultists pass off this com-
mitment as "coercive persuasion" and conveniently characterize
the individual as a victim of evil cults.189
This resocialization idea is implicit in the account of those
who view deprogramming as a social construction of subjective re-
ality. 190 In this "subjective" reality the hypothesis of mind control
by cults provides a plausible justification for deprogrammers to re-
store conventional ideologies, such as orthodox Christianity or Ju-
daism, to cult adherents. 191
A final procult viewpoint emphasizes the role of family power
in explaining the success of deprogramming. 192 Family members
prepared to go to desperate lengths in involuntary deprogram-
ming 93 solely out of love or concern for the cult adherent will cre-
ate a powerful impression on him. Procultists maintain that such
extremism is difficult to resist and may convince the cult adherent
that he is now with those who truly love him and have his best
interest at heart. This demonstration facilitates a return to the
family and a repudiation of the cult.194
Underlying this collection of ideas are two themes:
Deprogramming includes brainwashing; and cults do not brainwash
their inductees into cult adherence. Rejection of either of these hy-
potheses considerably weakens the procult perspectives on how
deprogramming works. If deprogrammers do not brainwash but
simply engage in freewheeling critical discussions about cult meth-
ods and beliefs as a result of which deprogrammees voluntarily re-
pudiate their cult adherence, the remains of the resocialization hy-
pothesis are too trivial or innocent for the cult defender's purposes.
Similarly, talk of exorcism or subjective construction of reality de-
pends upon the idea that cult brainwashing is a myth. Providing,
however, that the belief in cult brainwashing is true, the extreme
189. See, e.g., A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY, supra note 187, at 152; A. SHUPE& D.
BROMLEY, STRANGE GODs: THE GanAT AmmcAN CULT SCARE 193 (1981).
190. See Kim, Religious Deprogramming and Subjective Reality, 40 Soc. ANALYsis
197, 197 (1979) (relying on the work of P. BERGER & J. LucKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF RwALrrY (1967)).
191. See Kim, supra note 190, at 198.
192. A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY, supra note 187, at 149-50.
193. Involuntary deprogramming entails considerable expense and risk. Professional
deprogrammers charge up to $15,000 for their services. Moreover, the parent incurs legal
jeopardy if the deprogramming is not carried out pursuant to a court order. The parent may
be charged with unlawful imprisonment, kidnaping, and violation of the child's civil rights.
See Delgado, supra note 1, at 83-85; Note, supra note 23, at 296.
194. See A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY, supra note 187, at 152; A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY,
supra note 189, at 196-99.
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measures some families take are understandable.
1. The Assertion that Deprogramming Is a Form of
Brainwashing
The assertion that deprogrammers brainwash cult adherents
into repudiating their religious affiliations does not withstand anal-
ysis. Although limited similarities exist between involuntary
deprogramming and cult conversion-for instance, the use of ini-
tial coercion and confinement' 95-important distinctions set the
two activities apart. The deprogrammer aims at engaging the cult
adherent in a dialogue or exchange of viewpoints' 96 -even some
procult writers admit that this is an important step in the
deprogramming process - whereas cultic conditioning aims at pro-
ducing an uncritical listener who absorbs and repeats what is
said. 197 Deprogrammers attempt to encourage critical thought and
assessment; 98 cults prefer for their inductees to take dogma as
given and attempt to counter critical thought with peer pressure,
distractive emotions, or mindless meditation and chants.199 If criti-
cal or questioning comments are brought to the surface, they are
answered with a repetition of dogma, or put off until later and
never answered. 00 Thus, the give and take of a legitimate
deprogramming session differs radically from the techniques used
to produce compliance and mental uniformity in cult
organizations.
If deprogramming constitutes brainwashing it is unclear what
activities would not count as brainwashing. Dialogue and exchange
of ideas are not brainwashing. Perhaps what the procult advocate
finds objectionable about deprogramming is not the method but
the result. The belief that cults brainwash their members and de-
195. For an example of the type of techniques used by one deprogrammer, see Del-
gado, supra note 1, at 85 n.444.
196. See id.; see also A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY, supra note 189, at 189.
197. See R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 72, 121 (cultists taught to pray, "[m]ake us ro-
bots for God"; cultist "couldn't think ... [i]t was like all those communication circuits in
my brain were just fractured"); Meeting Report, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 62 ("zombie-like"
mental state), 14, 18, 27, 32, 45, 62, 64 (stereotyped, programmed responses); Rofes, supra
note 6, at 3, col. 1 (reporter for campus newspaper decided, after one week's stay with the
cult, to "give up the complexities of Harvard, [his] thesis and Gen[eral] Ed[ucation] re-
quirements and live [the] life of [a cult member]").
198. See supra notes 23-24, 84-88 & 134-38 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 9-14 & 44-61 and accompanying text.
200. See JOaNSTOWN REPORT, supra note 11, at 17; C. EDWARDS, supra note 26, at 93;
see also supra note 11; R. LnrrON, supra note 9, at 66-83 (prisoners taught to feel guilty, to
repress doubts).
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prive their members of freedom of thought is inconvenient for cult
apologists. Therefore, the apologists suggest that those who hold
that belief have been brainwashed into accepting it.201 The fallacy
of this argument has been exposed earlier:20 2 a brainwashing hy-
pothesis does not relate to the content of a belief but to the way in
which it is induced and held. Little evidence suggests that the
techniques employed by most deprogrammers approach the dan-
gers posed by coercive persuasion.
2. The Assertion that Cults Do Not Brainwash
There are significant evidentiary difficulties with the claim
made by cult apologists that cults do not brainwash inductees. The
main difficulty for procult advocates is that they must reject com-
pletely a large number of detailed accounts given by ex-cultists of
their cult experience.20 Cult apologists categorize these accounts
as "horror stories, '204 implying that they are fictional rather than
factual. The striking similarity among these accounts is explained
as the product of deprogramming or as after the fact explanations
invented to dissipate anxiety, guilt, and responsibility.20 5
It is true that deprogrammers sometimes prompt deprogram-
mees to describe themselves as "brainwashed." As already noted,20 6
the concept of brainwashing is to some extent esoteric and outside
the vocabulary of most Americans. But just because the
deprogrammer prompts the admission does not mean it is not true.
The details of cult life that deprogrammees reveal-deception,
confinement, high pressure proselytization and indoctrination tac-
tics, lack of privacy, threats, pressures to conform and not to criti-
cize, emotional manipulation-constitute coercive persuasion even
201. Sociologists and attorneys who have links to cults, like parents, may tend to re-
ject what is inconvenient for them to believe-namely that the accounts of life in the cults
given by deprogrammed ex-members may be quite accurate. See, e.g., supra notes 186-88
and accompanying text (procult view that unflattering depictions of cult life and methods
offered by ex-members are untrue, implanted in them by deprogrammers and family mem-
bers for extrinsic reasons).
202. See supra notes 87-88 & 134-35 and accompanying text.
203. Most of the descriptions of cult practices and cult life cited in the footnotes of
this Article are first person accounts by ex-members. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9-
17 & 37-62.
204. See A. SHUPE & D. BROMLEY, supra note 187, at 154 (atrocity stories); A. SHuPE &
D. BROMLEY, supra note 189, at 198-201 (horrific stories).
205. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 194; Anthony, Regulation of Alternative Reli-
gions by Law or Private Action: Can and Should We Regulate?, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 120, 120-21 (1979).
206. See sources cited supra note 26.
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if the individual would not use that term unprompted.
Thus, the cult defender must reject not only the deprogram-
mer's hypothesis of cultic thought reform but all the claims made
by the ex-cultists in the "horror stories." A sympathetic sociologist
researching a cult as participant-observer or a lawyer defending it
may be content with this blanket rejection, but a court of law
should not acquiesce so readily. A court will consider the credibil-
ity of individual witnesses and the extent to which their evidence
is corroborated by other witnesses or hard evidence. In the case of
the new religious cults a wide range of evidence both from ex-cult-
ists and independent investigators provides a basis for an account
of the physical, psychological, and physiological tactics used by
cults to induce conversion.0 7 The sophisticated techniques em-
ployed by cults fit the models of brainwashing developed well
before the new cults were here. 20 8
B. How Deprogramming Works-Anticult Perspectives
Deprogramming advocates present two distinct accounts of the
manner in which deprogramming works: An abreactive theory ac-
cording to which the deprogrammer achieves his ends by creating
an intense emotional state in the deprogrammee, and a discursive
account according to which a successful outcome depends upon en-
gaging the deprogrammee in a critique and evaluation of the mode
and content of her religious adherence.
1. Abreactive Therapy
According to the abreactive account:
Recently implanted abnormal patterns of behavior which were produced by
stress and strain can be broken up by producing a state of severe emotional
excitement, especially great anger and aggression or intense fear and anxiety.
Dramatic relief occurs when an intense abreactive experience is followed by a
phase of collapse, which may be followed by smiles or tears.""
A related account 210 considers a successful deprogramming one
that induces a sudden change in the cultist, or a "snapping" back
to the precult personality. This "snapping" is an analogous rever-
sal of the sudden change of personality often present in conversion
to cults.21'
207. See supra notes 10-17 & 37-61 and accompanying text.
208. The various models of coercive persuasion are set out supra note 9.
209. Shapiro, Destructive Cultism, 15 Am. FAM. PHYsiciAN 80, 81 (Feb. 1977).
210. F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 13, at 68.
211. Id.
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Several difficulties attend the abreactive and snapping ac-
counts of deprogramming. First, the sudden change postulated by
both theories often does not occur. Even advocates refer to cases in
which deprogrammees change by way of a smooth progression
rather than sudden reversal.212 Second, both "snapping" and abre-
action resemble some of the more dubious cult conversion tech-
niques, such as deliberate induction of carefully staged emotional
states as a substitute for critical thought, or alternation of guilt
and euphoria as a means of producing emotional collapse.2 3 Third,
abreaction or snapping by themselves do not yield the cultist any
understanding of his cult adherence, thus leaving him vulnerable
to reconversion to the cult.2 14 Fourth, the abreactive approach may
be constitutionally impermissible: nonconsensual induction of in-
tense emotional states is difficult to square with the emerging right
of mental privacy. 15
2. The Discursive Approach
A wide range of participants in and investigators of the
deprogramming process emphasize the central role of conversa-
tional exchange in deprogramming.2116 The deprogrammer attempts
to engage the cultist in a discussion that requires him to go beyond
the programmed responses instilled by cult conversion. 17 Although
many deprogrammers begin with a subject that is sure to be com-
212. Id. at 150.
213. Meeting Report, supra note 4, at 6, 14, 57, 67, 70 (guilt and anxiety); Boyes,
Inside the Frightening World of Fanatical "Brainwashing" Moon Sect, 122 CONG. REc.
1391 (1976) (induced excitement and euphoria achieved through "tortuous regimen of
chanting, singing, shouting, praying and relentless brainwashing"); R. ENRoTH, supra note 6,
at 102 (emotions "choreographed"); Delgado, supra note 1, at 40 n.226 ("lovebombing");
Harayda, I Was a Robot for Sun Myung Moon, GLAMouR, at 256 (Apr. 1976) (mountaintop
experience).
214. See W. APPEL, CULTS IN AMEPCA: PROGRAMMED FOR PARADISE 148-49 (1983); see
also Anthony, The Fact Pattern Behind the Deprogramming Controversy: An Analysis and
an Alternative, 9 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 73, 86 (1979) (deprogramming does not
produce insight).
215. See M. Shapiro, supra note 36 (extended argument for protection of menta-
tion-right of thought-under first amendment); see also Kaimowitz v. Department of
Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct., July 10, 1973).
216. Procult writers describe the discussion as harsh and scathing; anticult writers de-
scribe it as calm and sympathetic, but probing. Compare ACLU, supra note 110, with F.
CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 13, at 64-68; T. PATRICK, supra note 23.
217. See, e.g., F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 13, at 65-66 (parents initially
soften with questions and arguments); T. PATRICK, supra note 23, at 78 (concentrating on
questions to which no programmed response exists); see also sources cited supra notes 23 &
83-84.
11091984]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
mon ground-the teachings or practices of the cult-virtually any
subject will do.218 The aims of conversational exchange are to rein-
troduce the cultist to critical discussion and, later, to provide the
informational background necessary for the cultist to make an in-
formed choice of religious affiliation. 19
One of the more successful deprogrammers has analogized the
discursive process to recharging a car battery.220 A more human
centered analogy would be physical therapy. Bedridden patients
require physical exercise if they are to regain the complete use of
limbs long unused.221 Manipulation by the therapist and gradually
increasing use by the patient may eventually lead to a restoration
of normal use and functioning. 222 As in a conversation, both pa-
tient and therapist are significant actors in this process. Analo-
gously, the deprogrammer activates unused "muscles" necessary
for the deprogrammee's exercise of free and critical thought; once
gradually exercised, the deprogrammee uses those abilities to eval-
uate his own situation.
Some critics have suggested that the conversational model of
deprogramming is inconsistent with the cult thought reform hy-
pothesis that is used to justify it:
[U]ltimately even those who claim that cult members are brainwashed must
communicate with them in terms of reason, logic, and ideas. These are the
very things that cult members are supposed to be unable to deal with!..
Thus the very logic of deprogramming and why it should work is hopelessly
inconsistent, contradictory, and illogical .... [D]eprogrammers rely on the
very reasoning capabilities of cult members, which they claim in the same
breath cannot exist .... 223
The above argument can be expressed in the following di-
lemma: If cultists can reason, deprogramming is unnecessary; if
cultists cannot reason, deprogramming is futile; either way
deprogramming cannot be justified. An analogy to physical therapy
reveals the fallacy of this argument: if patients can use their leg
muscles, physical therapy is unnecessary; if they cannot use their
leg muscles, physical therapy is futile; either way physical therapy
is unjustified. The point is that there are intermediate cases be-
218. See, e.g., J. CLARK & M. LANGONE, supra note 2, at 73-74 (discussion of war in
Afghanistan).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 32-88 (when deprogramming permissible).
220. T. PATICK, supra note 23, at 36; see F. CONWAY & J. SIEGELMAN, supra note 13,
at 66 (opens up a mind snapped shut).
221. REHABILITATION MEDICINE 12 (P. Nichols 2d ed. 1980) (physiotherapists con-
cerned with early mobilization and short term rehabilitation after illness or injury).
222. Id. at 17-23 (emphasis in original) (manipulation and exercise therapy).
223. A. SHuPE & D. BROMLEY, supra note 189, at 185.
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tween the normal leg user and the paraplegic,124 or between the
normal reasoner and a zombie who lacks all reasoning power. The
physical therapist and the deprogrammer strengthen a potentiality
that has become weakened through lack of use. The potentiality is
not completely absent, but neither is it at normal strength. It can-
not be fully and freely exercised without therapeutic intervention.
The physical therapy analogy also helps explain the phenome-
non of "floating, ' 225  in which after a seemingly successful
deprogramming the cultist relapses and returns to the cult.226 An
initial therapeutic success may not, by itself, be sufficient to
strengthen the potential for free thought weakened by lack of use.
A gradual process of building up the strength of the patient/
deprogrammee will often be necessary.
The discursive model probably does not tell the whole story of
successful deprogramming. Simple absence from the cult environ-
ment in which thought reform is reinforced may well be important.
The presence of parents or spouses may also have an influencing
effect.227 The peak emotional states pointed to by abreaction theo-
rists will sometimes result as a byproduct of the discursive process
that the deprogrammee is engaged in, and may facilitate an other-
wise difficult transition from cultist to ex-cultist.2
28
The discursive model also avoids the defects of the procult or
224. Note that paraplegics and quadriplegics still require physical therapy, but this is
not aimed at the reutilization of paralyzed limbs. See REAILrrATiON MEDICIne, supra note
221, at 224-25 (paraplegics and quadriplegics taught to use parts of body which remain func-
tional, to compensate for those that are paralyzed).
225. "Floating" is a period of ambivalence and mood swings. See T. PATRICK, supra
note 23, at 36; Robins, Our Son's New "Heavenly Father," 251 SATURDAY EVENING POST,
Sept. 1976, at 37, 117.
226. "Floating" may also be an exercise of an ex-cultist's faculty of free choice, which
has been restored through deprogramming. To follow the physical therapy analogy, this is
similar to the case of an athlete, injured in competition, whose muscle function is restored
through therapy, following which the athlete chooses to re-enter athletic competition once
again with all its attendant risks.
227. R. ENROTH, supra note 6, at 79-80 (demonstration of parental love and devotion
pivotal in some deprogrammings); T. PATRICK, supra note 23, at 26-28, 72 (parental love and
concern critical elements of kidnapping); Remsberg & Remsberg, The Rescue of Alison
Cardais, GooD HOUSEKEEPING, Apr. 11, 1976, at 109, 141.
228. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. An internally generated abreactive
experience seems less problematic than one intentionally induced as a means of changing an
individual. When I experience an emotional response to an insight or life event, the response
is mine-I undergo it. But if another induces a response in me for his or her instrumental
reasons, then it is something that happens to me-it is not genuine. On finding out that the
other induced it, I might experience shock, mortification, betrayal, or a sense of having been
manipulated. On learning about the causation of the first event, I likely would have no such
response.
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abreaction models. It does not depend upon false empirical as-
sumptions as the procult models do,22 nor does it suffer from the
constitutional infirmities of the abreaction account. 30 Providing
the deprogrammer does not attempt to preach a new religion 23 1 or
force emotions oi the cultist,23 2 no constitutional difficulties would
seem to arise. Discursive evaluation is the most direct and success-
ful path to the goals of deprogramming within the conceptual
framework of part H: a restoration of freedom of thought by which
the cultist can make a free and informed choice of religious
affiliation.23s
V. OBJECTIONS TO DEPROGRAMMING
In addition to those discussed earlier, a few additional objec-
tions have been leveled against deprogramming. One objection to
deprogramming compares the high pressure tactics used by many
religious and social institutions to brainwashing. It also questions
the basis for the line drawn between those who are and those who
are not to be subject to deprogramming. Advocates of this objec-
tion maintain that society discriminates against "cult" groups be-
cause they are new and different.23 4
Most conventional religions, however, do not deceive their re-
cruits as flagrantly or pressure them as forcefully as the recent
cults do. Nor are the consequences of membership in conventional
religions so severe as they are with the cults. 23 5 Moreover, most
members of mainstream churches and other social institutions
have significant contact with the outside world and are able to
deprogram themselves out of coercive influences by discussing
their situation with friends.236 Furthermore, the argument for
deprogramming is general and not limited to new or peripheral
groups. If mainstream religious or social institutions employed the
229. See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
230. See supra text accompanying note 214.
231. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
234. See generally Gutman, supra note 90, at 69; A. SHUPE & D. BRomLEY, supra note
187, at 241-42.
235. See supra notes 4-18 & 36-61 and accompanying text (cult indoctrination prac-
tices and consequences described); Delgado, supra note 1, at 63-69 (section entitled: ON
DRAWING THE LINE).
236. See supra notes 11, 37, 38, 40, 50, 51, 55 & 61 and accompanying text (confine-
ment, isolation, lack of opportunity for reflection or self-deprogramming); Delgado, supra
note 1, at 63-69.
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same range of coercive tactics as the cults, deprogramming would
be equally justified.
A second objection to deprogramming relies on the premise
that all religions were once cults. Thus, deprogramming of cultists
would prevent new religions from becoming established.2 8 7 Admit-
tedly, most religions have been intensely evangelical at their outset
and may even have qualified as cults. But they have not brain-
washed their members through sleep deprivation, drugs, emotional
manipulation, confinement, and invasion of privacy,"8 nor con-
cealed their own nature as religions." 9 The only effect the exis-
tence of deprogramming need have on those new religions that do
use thought reform methods is a modification of their proselytiza-
tion and conversion techniques so that the strategies employed are
less coercive and deceptive. Deprogramming is not necessary when
religious conversion is voluntary and based on informed consent.4 °
A third objection is that intervention should be reserved for
cases in which the cultist is either civilly committable or insane.4 1
Insanity certainly would justify a court order of conservatorship
and, if it were warranted, deprogramming. But judicial interven-
tion need not be limited to such extreme cases. The law recognizes
many degrees of mental impairment short of insanity: diminished
capacity,2 2 irresistible impulse,243 senility sufficient to trigger
traditional conservatorships,24 automatism,245 and epilepsy.246
There is no reason not to allow limited intervention in novel situa-
tions such as cult brainwashing, especially when the objective is to
render the mind freer than before. The law does not respect civil
liberties by pretending that those liberties cannot be taken away
by the determined actions of nongovernmental groups. A govern-
ment that truly respects these liberties will act to protect cult vic-
tims from thought reform and to restore lost freedoms.
237. For a discussion of the view that all religions were originally cults, see A. J. RunIN
& M. RUDIN, supra note 2, at 19-26.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 32-88 (cults' coercive persuasion practices);
Delgado, supra note 1, at 64-65 (cult practices rejected by mainstream churches).
239. See sources cited supra note 161.
240. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (criteria for permissible
programming).
241. See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 1291 n.53, 1311.
242. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 32, at 325-32.
243. Id. at 283-86.
244. AMERIcAN BAR FoUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 250-302 (S.
Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).
245. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 32, at 337-41.
246. Id. at 337.
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Deprogramming attempts to achieve these ends.247
A final objection is that deprogramming would be subject to
vague tests and rules, and therefore be open to abuse.248 Judicial
supervision will be required to prevent abuses of deprogramming.
There is no reason, however, to suppose that courts, legislatures,
and commentators cannot frame clear, straightforward, and com-
prehensive rules covering both substance and procedure. Recent
scholarship has already made a start toward the provision of a
scheme of rules. 49
VI. CONCLUSION
The deprogramming of a religious cultist is morally and con-
stitutionally permissible if a court finds that the cultist lacks an
informed understanding of his situation or the volitional capacity
to consent to it. "Informed understanding of his situation" in-
cludes awareness of the forces and pressures that a cult has
brought to bear on the cultist to induce conversion. A cultist who
has gained this knowledge and possesses the capacity to make a
choice has already achieved the aims of deprogramming and will
not be subject to that process. If a court finds that a cultist lacks
either the requisite knowledge or capacity, it may order the cultist
deprogrammed.
Deprogramming should aim at providing the cultist with the
relevant information and restoring her volitional capacity for ren-
dering informed consent. It should not aim at providing a substi-
tute religion or lifestyle. Although deprogramming of this limited
variety may result in abandonment of former belief and affiliation,
this does not render deprogramming unconstitutional. The cultist's
former beliefs are not chosen freely; the new beliefs are chosen
freely and thus deserve constitutional primacy. Deprogramming
carried out under the "discursive model" meets the constitutional
criteria outlined and is capable of being defended against a num-
247. A related objection is that solutions like deprogramming reinforce a view of
human beings as incapable of decisionmaking or freedom of the will. Hargrove, Evil Eyes
and Religious Choices, 17 Soc'Y 20, 24 (Mar.-Apr. 1980). This objection ignores that
deprogramming requires a court to find that cult brainwashing deprives cultists of their free
will and also that deprogramming restores this faculty. Thus, the belief in deprogramming is
compatible with the belief that human beings are capable of exercising free will; it simply
reflects the possibility of the loss of that faculty. What deprogramming does not do is rein-
force the myth that free will is an indestructible metaphysical gift that once given can never
be taken away.
248. Note, supra note 28, at 1280-83; see, e.g., Comment, supra note 28, at 854-56.
249. Aronin, supra note 24.
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ber of common objections, including the charge that deprogram-
ming would discriminate against new or minority religions, and
disparage religious belief or doctrine.

